The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle: Was He Really a Functionalist?

Green, Christopher D. (1998) The Thoroughly Modern Aristotle: Was He Really a Functionalist? [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]

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In recent years a debate has developed over whether Aristotle's theory of the psuchê is properly characterized as having been "functionalist" in the sense that contemporary computational cognitive scientists claim to be adherents of that position. It is argued here that there are indeed some similarities between Aristotle's theory and that of contemporary functionalists, but that the differences between them make it misleading, at best, for functionalists to look to Aristotle for ancient support. In particular, it is argued that Aristotle would not have -- indeed, specifically did not -- support the claim, central to functionalism, that the mind can, in principle, be transported from one body to another simply by instantiating in the new body some set of organizational properties that were instantiated in the old.

Item Type:Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
Keywords:functionalism, Aristotle, philosophy, transportabilty, history
Subjects:Philosophy > Metaphysics
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:1370
Deposited By: Green, Christopher D.
Deposited On:15 Mar 2001
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:54

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