Schwitzgebel, Eric (2000) A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing - cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.
Item Type: | Preprint |
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Keywords: | belief, dispositions, dispositional, phenomenology, vagueness, functionalism, Ryle, externalism, gradual, gradualism, in-between, intermediate |
Subjects: | Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 1493 |
Deposited By: | Schwitzgebel, Eric |
Deposited On: | 09 May 2001 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:54 |
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