Why and How We Are Not Zombies

Harnad, Stevan (1995) Why and How We Are Not Zombies. [Journal (Paginated)]

Full text available as:

PDF - Accepted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

[img] HTML - Submitted Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.



A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:consciousness, reverse engineering, other-minds problem, bind/body problem, zombies, functionalism, epiphenomenalism, causality
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:1601
Deposited By: Harnad, Stevan
Deposited On:19 Jun 2001
Last Modified:02 May 2011 12:18

References in Article

Select the SEEK icon to attempt to find the referenced article. If it does not appear to be in cogprints you will be forwarded to the paracite service. Poorly formated references will probably not work.

Harnad, S. (1982) Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29 - 47.

Harnad, S. (1984) What are the scope and limits of radical behaviorist theory? The Behavioral and

Brain Sciences 7: 720 -721.

Harnad, S. (1989) Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial

Intelligence 1: 5-25.

Harnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346. [Reprinted in Hungarian

Translation as "A Szimbolum-Lehorgonyzas Problemaja." Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle

XLVIII-XLIX (32-33) 5-6: 365-383.]

Harnad, S. (1991) Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem.

Minds and Machines 1: 43-54.

Harnad, S. (1992) Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz

(Eds) Connectionism in Context Springer Verlag.

Harnad, S. (1992) The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A Scientific

Criterion. SIGART Bulletin 3(4) (October) 9 - 10.

Hayes, P., Harnad, S., Perlis, D. & Block, N. (1992) Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind. Minds and

Machines 2: 217-238.

Harnad, S. (1993) Grounding Symbols in the Analog World with Neural Nets. Think 2(1) 12 - 78

(Special issue on "Connectionism versus Symbolism," D.M.W. Powers & P.A. Flach, eds.). [Also

reprinted in French translation as: "L'Ancrage des Symboles dans le Monde Analogique a l'aide de

Reseaux Neuronaux: un Modele Hybride." In: Rialle V. et Payette D. (Eds) La Modelisation.

LEKTON, Vol IV, No 2.]

Harnad, S. (1993) Artificial Life: Synthetic Versus Virtual. Artificial Life III. Proceedings, Santa Fe

Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Volume XVI.

Harnad, S. (1993) Symbol Grounding is an Empirical Problem: Neural Nets are Just a Candidate

Component. Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. NJ:


Harnad, S. (1993) Problems, Problems: The Frame Problem as a Symptom of the Symbol Grounding

Problem. PSYCOLOQUY 4(34) frame-problem.11.

Harnad S. (1993) Discussion (passim) In: Bock, G.R. & Marsh, J. (Eds.) Experimental and

Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. CIBA Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: Wiley

Harnad, S. (1993) Turing Indistinguishability and the Blind Watchmaker. Presented at Conference on

"Evolution and the Human Sciences" London School of Economics Centre for the Philosophy of the

Natural and Social Sciences 24 - 26 June 1993.

Harnad, S. (1993) Grounding Symbolic Capacity in Robotic Capacity. In: Steels, L. and R. Brooks

(eds.) The "artificial life" route to "artificial intelligence." Building Situated Embodied Agents. New

Haven: Lawrence Erlbaum

Harnad, S, (1994) Does the Mind Piggy-Back on Robotic and Symbolic Capacity? To appear in: H.

Morowitz (ed.) "The Mind, the Brain, and Complex Adaptive Systems.

Harnad, S. (1994) Levels of Functional Equivalence in Reverse Bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing

Test for Artificial Life. Artificial Life 1(3): 293-301.

Harnad S, (1994) The Convergence Argument in Mind-Modelling: Scaling Up from Toyland to the

Total Turing Test. Cognoscenti 1:

Harnad, S. (1994) Computation Is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation: Cognition Isn't. Special

Issue on "What Is Computation" Minds and Machines (in press)


Repository Staff Only: item control page