Harnad, Stevan (1995) Why and How We Are Not Zombies. [Journal (Paginated)]
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Abstract
A robot that is functionally indistinguishable from us may or may not be a mindless Zombie. There will never be any way to know, yet its functional principles will be as close as we can ever get to explaining the mind.
Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
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Keywords: | consciousness, reverse engineering, other-minds problem, bind/body problem, zombies, functionalism, epiphenomenalism, causality |
Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 1601 |
Deposited By: | Harnad, Stevan |
Deposited On: | 19 Jun 2001 |
Last Modified: | 02 May 2011 12:18 |
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