FUTURE
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
John Stewart (http://www4.tpg.com.au/users/jes999/
)
(A later version of this paper has been published in the on-line
journal Dynamical Psychology (2001) which is at http://goertzel.org/dynapsyc/ )
ABSTRACT: Humans are able to construct mental representations
and models of possible interactions with their environment. They can use these
mental models to identify actions that will enable them to achieve their
adaptive goals. But humans do not use this capacity to identify and implement
the actions that would contribute most to the evolutionary success of humanity.
In general, humans do not find motivation or satisfaction in doing so, no
matter how effective such actions might be in evolutionary terms. From an
evolutionary perspective, this is a significant limitation in the psychological
adaptability of humans. This paper sets out to identify the new psychological
capacity that would be needed to overcome this limitation and how the new
capacity might be acquired. Humans that
develop this capacity will become self-evolving organisms - organisms that are
able to adapt in whatever ways are necessary for future evolutionary success,
largely unfettered by their biological and social past.
1.
INTRODUCTION
Is
the psychological evolution of humanity at an endpoint? Or are there
limitations and deficiencies in our psychological capacities that could drive
further evolution? Are there, for example, new forms of psychological software
that humans could acquire to improve our ability to adapt to whatever
challenges face us in the future?
One
way we can begin to answer this question is to ask whether there are blind
spots in our current psychological capacities. Are our existing abilities to
discover and implement useful adaptive behaviours seriously limited? Are we
unable to explore areas of the space of adaptive possibilities?
If
we discover that there are limitations in our current psychological capacities,
we can then ask whether these can be overcome by changes to our psychological
software. Can our psychological adaptability be improved by, for example, the
acquisition of new psychological skills and capacities? Can these be developed through
learning and appropriate experiences?
If
we find that there are limitations, and if these can only be overcome by
changes to our psychological software, we can then ask whether humans are
likely to make these changes. Will we do what is required to develop the
software? Will we be motivated to make whatever effort is necessary to evolve
our psychology? Or are humans caught in an evolutionary predicament—are we
unable to make these psychological improvements because of the limitations in
our psychological adaptability?
We
begin in section 2 by identifying significant limitations in our current
psychological capacities. Section 3 of the paper examines how these could be
overcome by the acquisition of new psychological abilities, and section 4
assesses the likelihood that humans will develop these capacities.
2.
CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
What
are the strengths and weaknesses of our current psychological adaptive
capacities?
Our
main strength compared with other organisms is our ability to use mental models
to discover and implement useful adaptations (see, for example, Popper, 1972
and Dennett, 1995). Instead of having to try out alternative actions in
practice, humans can use mental models to predict the effects of the
alternatives. Using representations of ourselves and of our environment, we can
try out possible adaptations mentally. This significantly reduces the need for
costly trial and error, and enables us to take account of the (predicted)
future consequences of our actions.
Our ability to test alternative behaviours mentally is the basis of our capacity to plan ahead, imagine alternatives, invent and adapt technology, build structures such as houses and roads, radically modify our external environment for our adaptive goals, establish long-term objectives, imagine how we might change the world, develop strategic plans, design projects and undertake activities that pay off only in the future, such as plant crops and feed animals.
The
acquisition of language greatly enhanced our capacity for mental modelling.
Language and associated forms of communication enabled humans to share the
knowledge that is used to construct useful models of reality. All members of a society could eventually acquire and use the knowledge
discovered by any individual. This enabled knowledge to be accumulated across
the generations. The progressive accumulation of knowledge has enabled humans
to model more accurately a greater range of interactions with our environment,
and to predict the consequences of our actions over wider scales of space and
time (Stewart, 1995). This has enabled us to discover more effective ways of
achieving our adaptive goals.
Our
ability to construct and manipulate models has also improved as we have learnt
to augment our mental abilities with external artefacts such as pen and paper,
books, recording devices, computers and other forms of artificial intelligence.
Our
mental adaptability can be expected to continue to improve as humanity
accumulates more knowledge about how the external world responds to our
interventions and as artificial intelligence is developed further.
In
principle, we could use mental modelling to greatly enhance our evolutionary
adaptability. We could use mental modelling to discover and implement
adaptations that are best for humanity in evolutionary terms. We could do this
by using modelling to identify the future consequences of alternative actions,
including their evolutionary effects. This would enable us to determine which
actions would contribute best to the evolutionary success of humanity. We would
be as effective at discovering the best adaptations as our models allowed. As
our modelling capacity improved, humanity would be able to adapt successfully
to a wider range of evolutionary challenges.
The
use of mental modelling for evolutionary adaptation would easily outperform
gene-based natural selection. Genetic evolution is largely blind and operates
by trial and error. It has no capacity to predict the future effects of
alternative adaptations and to use these predictions to identify the best
adaptation. Furthermore, genetic evolution cannot learn and accumulate
knowledge throughout the life of the individual. And it is unable to establish
adaptations that benefit only future generations and not the organism itself
[and its genes] (see for example, Stewart, 1997a). Once a species has
accumulated sufficient knowledge, the use of mental modelling for evolutionary
adaptation would enable it to adapt to a much wider range of events than a
similar species that evolves genetically.
However
we do not use our mental modelling in this way. We do not use it to discover
and implement the adaptations that will deliver evolutionary success to
humanity. Most humans are unconcerned about the evolutionary consequences of
their actions. Instead we use the enormous power of mental modelling to see how
we can act on the world to produce desirable psychological states and avoid
unpleasant ones. For most this means using modelling to pursue sex, wealth,
satisfying relationships, social status, fame and so on.
An
evolutionary perspective helps explain this state of affairs. As we have seen,
evolution would favour species that use mental modelling for evolutionary
adaptation. Once such a species emerged, it would flourish. But evolution was
not able to produce this capacity immediately in the evolution of life on
Earth. A brain that is capable of mental modelling took a very long time to
evolve by the blind trial-and-error of genetic evolution.
Until
mental modelling evolved, gene-based natural selection had to find simpler
arrangements to adapt organisms during their life. The simplest way to achieve this was to fit out the organism with
arrangements that discovered adaptations by trial and error. These arrangements
would make changes in the organism until a change is made that is found to be
adaptive in evolutionary terms. But what arrangements within the organism could
‘know’ whether a particular change is adaptive? The answer is easy to see when
the event to which the organism must adapt disrupts the effective functioning
of the organism—changes can be tested on the basis of their ability to restore
effective functioning (Ashby, 1960). For example, an organism trying to outrun
a predator might deplete the oxygen in its leg muscles below the level needed
for peak performance. Increases in the organism’s heart rate could be tried out
until oxygen levels are restored and the leg muscles are able to perform
effectively again. But this method will not work when an adaptive change produces
only future benefits to the organism, and does not produce any immediate
improvement within the organism (Beer, 1972). Examples include actions that
organize sexual reproduction, and much of the behaviour that protects social
status within a group. Neither of these generates any immediate benefits to the
organism that could be used as indicators of the usefulness of the behaviour.
How
could gene-based natural selection organise an organism so that changes that
produce no immediate benefit to the organism, but produce evolutionary benefits
in the longer term, would be selected as adaptations? How could possible
adaptations be tested within the organism to identify those that produced
benefits only in the longer term? The
simplest way is to test them against proxies for future evolutionary success.
Natural selection could fit out organisms with a system of internal goals and
rewards whose satisfaction is correlated with evolutionary success. Possible
adaptations would be tested within the organism against their ability to
achieve the internal goals or rewards (Frank, 1988. See also Stewart, 1997b).
Such
an organism would spend its life pursuing these internal rewards and goals.
This would be experienced by the organism as responding to motivations and to
emotional states and impulses. The genetic evolutionary mechanism would tune
these so that when the organism pursued its internal rewards, it would act in a
way consistent with evolutionary success. For example, actions that organise
sexual reproduction could be rewarded with pleasurable feelings, and behaviour
that could destroy an individual’s reputation within its social group could be
deterred by unpleasant feelings of guilt.
Until
they acquire a capacity for mental modelling, organisms have to be organised in
this way to pursue proxies for evolutionary success. But even when mental
modelling finally emerges, organisms would still have to be organised to pursue
the goals established by their internal reward system. This is because mental
modelling will be grafted on to an organism whose adaptation is already
organised by an internal motivation and reward system. Gene-based natural
selection can only build on whatever is already available. Furthermore, mental
modelling will not have the capability to immediately take over the adaptation
of the organism. The organisms would not have accumulated the detailed
knowledge and information needed for their models to be able to predict the
future consequences of a wide range of alternative actions—modelling will be less
effective than the pre-existing motivation and reward systems at discovering
the best adaptations (Stewart, 2000).
But
mental modelling will still provide immediate advantages. It enables the
organism to find better ways of achieving its internal rewards and motivations.
The organism can use mental models to identify the behaviours that will be best
at achieving outcomes that produce desirable internal states. Initially mental
modelling will not establish the adaptive goals of the organism—it begins as a
servant of the pre-existing motivation and reward systems.
However,
clashes and contradictions will begin to emerge as the superior adaptive
potential of mental modelling begins to be realised (Stewart, 2000). As the
organisms accumulate knowledge they will be able to predict the consequences of
alternative behaviours more accurately and further into the future. The
modelling capacity will begin to suggest different adaptations to those
supported by the pre-existing internal reward system. The superior adaptive
ability of mental modelling will enable the organism to see that particular
behaviours are in its interests, but the behaviours are not motivated or
rewarded by its pre-existing systems. In some circumstances, its pre-existing
systems may strongly motivate behaviours that the organism now sees are against
its interests. Increasingly as knowledge accumulates, what the organism wants
to do (as motivated by its pre-existing systems) will clash with what it sees
mentally is in its interests, particularly in the longer term.
Eventually
the organisms are likely to accumulate sufficient knowledge to model and
understand the evolutionary processes that have produced them. They will begin
to understand that the clashes they are experiencing between their adaptive
systems are symptoms of their participation in a major evolutionary transition.
They will see that they are located in a sequence that has the potential to
move from an organism that is organised by evolution to pursue proxies for
evolutionary success, to an organism that uses mental modelling to consciously
identify and implement whatever actions will contribute most to the
evolutionary success of the species.
It
is possible to locate humanity within this sequence. As we have already noted,
humans are not yet an organism that uses mental modelling to adapt in whatever
ways are needed for evolutionary success. We are not motivated to do so—the
evolutionary consequences of our actions are largely irrelevant to us. Instead
we use our mental modelling to work out how to achieve the goals set by our
internal reward and motivation system—goals that humans have been fitted out
with by natural selection and that are modified to a limited extent by
conditioning during their upbringing.
We
spend our lives pursuing desirable psychological states such as those
associated with popularity, self-esteem, sex, feelings of uniqueness, power,
food, and social status, and we try to avoid undesirable psychological states
such as those associated with stress, guilt, depression, loneliness, hunger,
and shame. It is of little or no concern to us whether these proxies for
evolutionary success in fact encourage behaviour that will bring evolutionary
success. When our evolutionary interests clash with our motivations and emotional
responses, our evolutionary interests lose out. In this way, our motivation and
reward system severely constrains how we are able to adapt and what we can
choose to do.
But
humans are increasingly encountering situations where our mental models suggest
different adaptations to those motivated by our pre-existing internal reward
systems. Our mental models are becoming sophisticated enough to out-perform our
internal reward system in many situations. For example, many find that we are
motivated to eat larger quantities of high-fat food than we know is in our
longer–term health interests. Many find that rather than do the study that we
see is needed to enhance our career prospects, we are more strongly motivated
to spend our time doing other things. We cannot easily change personality
traits and habits that we see are against our interests. Few of us can
effortlessly ‘turn the other cheek’ even when we can see mentally that it is in
our interests to do so. We find it very hard to do things we are not motivated
to do.
However,
humanity in general has not yet developed a comprehensive capacity to resolve
these conflicts. When we see that our motivations and emotional responses are
causing us to behave contrary to our interests, we cannot just change our motivations
or override them. In general, humans have a very limited ability to consciously
change their motivations and emotional responses to align them with the
findings of their mental models. Increasingly humans are discovering that
although a particular course of action provides immediate emotional rewards, it
is not in their longer-term interests. However, the fact that we can see this
does not automatically empower us to change the way we will respond
emotionally, or enable us to choose to be more highly motivated to pursue our
longer-term interests. Humans have no comprehensive capacity to align their
internal reward and motivation system with whatever goals they may set using
their mental models (Stewart, 2000).
If
we could align our motivations with our mental goals, it would mean that once
we used our mental modelling to identify a long-term goal, we would be able to
find motivation and satisfaction in whatever we had to do to pursue the goal.
Behaviour that was normally highly motivated and rewarding would no longer be
so if we saw that it conflicted with our central goal. We would be able to
effortlessly defer immediate gratification whenever it was in our longer-term
interests to do so. We would be able to change the emotional responses and motivations
that entrench any personality traits and cognitive patterns that stand in the
way of achieving our goals.
Far
from being able to consciously change our likes, dislikes, motivations and
emotional responses, we are barely aware of them and their effects on our
behaviour. We tend to look out the world and see how we can change it to
achieve desired emotional states, rather than look inwardly and see how we can
change our emotional states. We tend to take our emotional responses and
motivations as fixed and given, rather than as things we can control
consciously (Stewart, 1997b). Instead of seeing our motivations, values, likes,
dislikes and personality traits as limiting our adaptability, we see them as
defining who we are.
The
burgeoning self-help and human potential literature is evidence that humans are
experiencing these conflicts, and that we do not yet have a comprehensive
ability to resolve them in our interests. This is underlined by the findings of
a comprehensive survey of self-help literature undertaken by Covey (1989): much
of the literature is directed at techniques to enable individuals to reduce the
power of motivations and emotional responses that clash with their longer-term
interests (e.g. techniques for deferring immediate gratification), and is
directed at techniques to enable individuals to find satisfaction and
motivation in the pursuit of longer-term objectives. He also found that many
religious practices (hymns, mediation, prayer etc) serve these functions.
In
summary, humans do not have the ability to align their internal reward and
motivation system with goals of their choosing. They are unable to choose to
find satisfaction and motivation in whatever adaptations will serve these
goals. If humans had such a capacity, they could choose to implement whatever
actions would advance the evolutionary success of humanity, and they would find
satisfaction and motivation in this. Without such a capacity, we are not able
to implement many adaptations that are in the evolutionary interests of
humanity. We continue to spend our lives pursuing internal rewards and
motivations established by our evolutionary and social past, even though we now
are equipped with a capacity for mental modelling that is increasingly superior
in adaptive terms. The immensely powerful technologies humanity is developing
such as genetic engineering and artificial intelligence are being harnessed to
serve our internal reward and motivation systems, not to advance our
evolutionary potential.
For
these reasons, our psychological adaptability is fundamentally limited in
evolutionary terms. Adaptations exist that are superior in evolutionary terms,
we can see that they are superior, but we do not implement them. Our
motivations and emotional responses severely constrain what we can do. Because
of this psychological limitation, humanity is not yet able to take advantage of
the superior ability of mental modelling to discover and implement the most
effective adaptations. We can see that it is potentially far superior to gene-based
natural selection, but are unable to exploit this potential.
3.
CAN THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS BE OVERCOME?
Can
humanity overcome its current psychological limitations? Rather than continue
to pursue only internal proxies for evolutionary success, can humanity develop
the capacity to use mental models to identify and implement whatever
adaptations are best in evolutionary terms? Can we, for example, develop new
psychological software that will enable us to align our internal rewards and
motivations with whatever actions are identified by our mental modelling as
being in our evolutionary interests?
The
theory of metasystem transitions developed by Turchin (1977) points to the type
of psychological reorganisation that might overcome these limitations.
Turchin’s theory deals in large part with the evolution of new adaptive
capabilities in organisms. He suggests that these typically emerge when a new
level of control arises that manages a collection of pre-existing adaptive
processes. The new level of control might, for example, manage the pre-existing
processes so that they henceforth serve a new adaptive objective. The new
controller would align the goals and operation of the pre-existing processes
with the new adaptive requirement. The result would be a new metasystem S’ in
which sub systems Si (the pre-existing adaptive processes) are
integrated by a new mechanism ‘C’ that controls the Si. The
emergence of the new system S’ is a metasystem transition (MST). Turchin
demonstrates that the emergence of learning, association and other key
milestones in the evolution of adaptability in organisms can be usefully
interpreted within this framework.
This
framework suggests how the current psychological limitations of humanity might
be overcome. Humans would need to develop a new psychological structure (‘C’
within the above framework) that is able to manage and control their internal
reward and motivation system. The new structure would use mental modelling to
identify the actions that would contribute best to the evolutionary success of
humanity, and it would manage the pre-existing adaptive processes so they
motivate and reward those actions.
We
can draw on the work of Conant and Ashby (1970) to identify one of the key
capacities that the new psychological structure must have if it is to manage
the pre-existing adaptive processes effectively. Conant and Ashby demonstrated
that if a regulator is to regulate a complex system effectively, it must
include a model of the system. So the new psychological structure would have to
develop models of the operation of the pre-existing adaptive processes
themselves. To develop these models, the new structure would have to acquire
knowledge about the pre-existing adaptive processes, how they operate, what
effects they have on behaviour, and how their operation could be modified,
influenced and managed. Emotional states, motivations and other elements of the
pre-existing adaptive processes would have to become the objects of
consciousness.
This
suggests that the emergence of the new psychological structure would have to
involve the turning of attention inwards—individuals would have to develop the
capacity to direct their attention inside themselves and become aware of their
mental, emotional and physical states. What evidence is there that humans can
develop such an ability, and what might it lead to? We can begin to answer this
question by examining the experiences of individuals who carry out the practice
of introspective meditation. A significant part of this practice involves
individuals directing their awareness and attention at their internal mental
and other states. Meditators report that they can enter a state in which there
is a clear distinction between the flow of thought and feelings on the one
hand, and the “I” that observes these on the other—the meditator is aware of
herself as an observing “I” that is separate from her emotional states,
thoughts and sensations—they arise and pass (see, for example, Deikman, 1996).
This state contrasts with much of normal experience in which the “I’ tends to
be absorbed in emotional reactions and thoughts and is not aware of itself as
separate to them.
Foreman
(1998) provides evidence that extended meditation can, at least in some cases,
produce this separation between the observing “I” and mental contents during
normal life activities. The individual experiences the separation even when not
meditating. In this state, thoughts, emotions and sensations as well as things
in the external environment are experienced continually as objects of
consciousness.
This
emergence and strengthening of a self-aware, observing “I” is an important step
toward the formation of the new psychological structure that is an essential
part of the MST we are interested in. Because the new “I” is separate from
mental contents, it can observe the pre-existing adaptive processes in action
and accumulate the knowledge needed to model and understand their operation.
However, this is only a first step. The observing “I” reported by introspective
meditators is largely passive. It does not develop a comprehensive capacity to
modify and manage the operation of the pre-existing adapting processes in the
pursuit of evolutionary or other objectives. Techniques in addition to
meditation are needed to develop a new “I” that has the will and power to do
this.
A
system of techniques that are specifically claimed to produce such a new “I”
has been outlined by Nicol (1980a). Nicol was originally trained in this system
by G. I. Gurdjieff and P. D. Ouspensky, but its historical origin is not clear
(Moore, 1999). The practices have been taught in various forms in many
countries since the 1920’s by a number of groups, some organised
internationally (Needham, 1995). However, the system has not been studied and
tested systematically by academic psychologists, although a number of the
specific practices and insights of the system are very similar to some that
have been adopted and developed for use in clinical psychology, cognitive
therapy and Neuro-Linguistic Programming (see, for example, Tart, 1986).
The
techniques are explicitly directed at developing a new “I” that manages the
pre-existing psychological processes of the individual in the service of
whatever aims are adopted by the new “I” (Nicol, 1980b). The new “I” or master is produced by a
number of practices that begin by functionally separating the individual’s
psychology into an observing part and an observed part (Nicol, 1980c). The
observing part is the precursor of the new “I” or master. But initially it is a
passive and non-judgemental witness of the observed part, broadly equivalent to
the observing “I” that is developed through introspective meditation. From the
outset, however, the observing “I” produced by Nicol’s techniques is developed
during the normal activities of life, rather than through a separate practice
such as meditation.
The
observed part includes the physical sensations, emotions, motivations, mental
images and thoughts that arise as the individual goes about her daily
activities and interactions—the observed part is the pre-existing adaptive
processes in operation. A key objective of the system is to develop the ability
of the observing “I” to stand outside and not be absorbed in the stream of
mental contents that comprise the observed part. Separation between the
precursor to the new “I” or master and the pre-existing adaptive processes is
essential for the eventual development of a master that is functionally
independent of the pre-existing processes and that can therefore manage and
modify them.
As
the new “I” develops, the techniques utilised by the system enable the “I” to
accumulate knowledge about the operation of the physical, emotional and mental
adaptive processes, the effects they have on behaviour, and how their operation
can be modified and influenced to bring their goals into line with the central
aims of the new “I”. This enables the “I” to develop mental models of the
pre-existing processes and how they can be managed. The “I” develops these
capacities in much the same way that the individual earlier developed the
ability to manage her external environment—the individual first became aware of
her external environment and of objects within it, then gradually accumulated
knowledge about how the environment responded to her interventions, and used
this to develop the capacity to manage external circumstances to achieve her
adaptive goals. Now the individual turns her attention inwards and develops the
capacity to manage and modify elements of her internal environment.
The
new “I” or master that finally emerges is free of the adaptive goals of the
pre-existing adaptive processes. It is able to modify these goals to align them
with its own goals and objectives. The pre-existing processes no longer operate
as constraints or restrictions on what the individual can decide to do. She can
now find motivation and emotional satisfaction in whatever activities serve her
central aim.
Key
techniques and practices that are used by the system to develop the new “I” or
master are self-observation, dis-identification, self-remembering, and divided
attention.
Self-observation
is the lynchpin of the system (Nicol, 1980c). It begins the functional
separation of the individual’s psychology into an observing part and an
observed part. Self-observation requires the individual to turn her attention
inwards and observe the physical sensations, emotional states and thoughts that
arise during the normal activities and interactions of every-day life. This
process has nothing in common with an individual cataloguing her personality
attributes and traits. Instead it involves the individual standing outside and
passively observing the actual sensations and states as they arise, in real
time.
Self-observation
must be passive and non-judgemental to develop full separation between the
observing “I” and the operation of the pre-existing adaptive processes. Without
this separation, the individual’s “I” will be identified with the thoughts,
emotional states and sensations that arise—it will be absorbed in and
participate in them; it will not stand outside, observe and ultimately be able
to manage them; the individual will continue to be her thoughts and emotional
responses. Passive and non-judgemental self-observation helps to ensure that
the observing “I” dis-identifies with mental contents.
At
first an individual finds it difficult to maintain dis-identified
self-observation for any length of time—she will tend to slip back into
identification with thoughts or emotional states, and will fail to be able to
stand outside or observe them for extended periods.
Self-remembering
is an important technique for overcoming this difficulty. It strengthens the
developing “I” or master, and renews its functional separation from the
pre-existing adaptive processes. In self-remembering the individual
simultaneously is aware that she is present and has the aim of developing a new
“I” while also being aware of her physical, emotional and mental states. This
act of self-remembering enables the individual to dis-identify and separate
from the pre-existing processes, and to renew and strengthen self-observation.
With practice an individual can enter a state of self-remembering whenever she
experiences a strong emotional state that would otherwise control her
behaviour. This provides the individual with the opportunity to choose
consciously how to act in response to the emotional state.
Divided
attention is a practice related to self-remembering in which the individual
remains aware that she is aware while observing physical, emotional and mental
states and going about normal daily activities.
Self-remembering
and divided attention are very important for developing the power of the new
“I” to manage the pre-existing processes. Once the emerging new “I” can remain
functionally separate from motivations and emotional impulses, and once it can
remain aware that it is separate from them and can act independently of them,
it can decide whether or not to be influenced by them. Instead of ‘going with’
these impulses as they arise, it can decide not to act on them. Importantly,
this functional separation also enables the new “I” to control the disposition
of attention. This enables the “I” to direct attention and energy only at
activities that serve the aims of the “I”. In these ways, the emerging new “I”
can begin to consciously free the individual from control by the internal
reward system.
But
this form of management is limited to working with existing motivations and
emotional impulses. To gain full control over its internal reward system, the
new “I” must be able to develop motivations and emotional responses appropriate
to its goals in circumstances that would not have previously evoked those
responses. It must be able to find motivation and satisfaction in all the
behaviours and actions needed to achieve its objectives.
The
key techniques described by Nicol for the development of this capacity are
based on the use of visualisation and the imagination. For example, if the
individual wishes to develop new responses and motivations for particular
circumstances and activities, the individual would imagine and visualise
themselves in the circumstances in ways that evoke the desired responses. The
system’s approach is based on the view that individuals cannot control the
operation of their emotional and motivational systems by thoughts or by
self-talk alone. This view is consistent with the fact that the motivation and
emotional system of humans evolved long before humans acquired a capability for
language, and before our mental capacities were highly developed. So our
emotional responses and motivations are not controlled and evoked by our
thinking and by our self-talk. Rather they are evoked by the patterns we
perceive in the circumstances we encounter (particularly patterns in social
situations). For this reason, the new “I” must learn to communicate with the
individual’s motivation and emotional system primarily through images and
imagined experiences rather than thoughts alone.
The
use of visualisation and imagination in this way is consistent with the ‘re-scripting’
techniques that are identified by Covey (1989) as a common element in many
systems of personal development. It is also consistent with the conclusions
reached by Cosmides and Tooby (2000) about the evolutionary function of
imagined experience in re-weighting emotional responses to particular
circumstances.
Through
experimentation and self-observation, the emerging “I” builds up a repertoire
of skills and techniques for managing the pre-existing adaptive processes. Many
of the skills it develops have counterparts in therapeutic systems such as
clinical psychology, psychotherapy, hypnotherapy, cognitive therapy and
psychoanalysis. However, the essential difference is that in this system, the
‘therapist’ is the new “I” or master—the therapist is internalised as a new
psychological structure within the individual.
It
is worth emphasising here that the new “I” would not manage the pre-existing
emotional and motivational systems by overriding and repressing them. The most
effective way it can manage is by letting the pre-existing processes continue
to solve the adaptive problems that they have evolved to handle, as far as
possible. The new “I” is not in a position to take over their functions
entirely. Instead the new “I” will do better if it limits its interventions to
adjusting the goals of the pre-existing systems to align them with its own
goals and aims. Just as the new “I” would continue to rely on the operation of
the adaptive systems that control the individual’s internal physiology, it
would also continue to rely on the pre-existing motivation and emotional
system. It takes them along with it in pursuit of new objectives. For example,
it would continue to use the ability of the emotional system to quickly
recognise significant patterns in social situations and in other circumstances.
And it would integrate these abilities into the new metasystem for use in other
cognitive functions.
In
fact, an individual who has developed a new “I” will have more varied and
diverse emotional responses than one who has not. This is because the existence
of an “I” that can unite the pre-existing processes behind a central aim allows
the pre-existing processes to differentiate and diversify where this is
beneficial to the central aim—the processes can be more diverse without
threatening the coherence of the individual’s psychology. Such a
differentiation and diversification of managed sub-systems is a characteristic
of all MSTs (Turchin, 1977 and Stewart, 1997c)).
What
evidence exists about the effectiveness of the system of techniques and
practices outlined by Nicol? As indicated above, there are no systematic third
person studies of the use of the practices and of their effects. However, there
is an extensive and growing literature of first person reports (for an annotated
bibliography see Driscoll, 1985 and 1999). In general, these reports suggest
that the use of the practices for only a short period can provide an individual
with some experience of what it would be like to develop a new “I” or master—it
is relatively easy for an individual to get a “taste” of what it would be like
to consciously manage her the pre-existing physical, emotional and mental
processes. In particular, it is not difficult for the individual to achieve a
state in which she experiences the “I” as standing outside the pre-existing
processes, and is able to modify their impact on her behaviour when she
chooses. However, to achieve the state on a more or less permanent basis is
more difficult: very few report that they have been able to do so, and then
only after persistent use of the practices over many years.
The
literature does not include any reports of individuals using the system to
pursue the goal of future evolutionary success. The original proponents of the
system did not promote its use for evolutionary objectives in the sense used in
this paper. However the system is obviously capable of being used to enable
individuals to adopt and pursue evolutionary ends, or any other aim for that
matter. It could be used to produce a psychological transformation that would
enable individuals to implement whatever actions would contribute most to the
future evolutionary success of humanity. Such a MST would overcome the
psychological limitations that currently restrict our evolutionary adaptability.
The system of techniques and practices would produce a new “I” or master that
could manage the pre-existing physical, emotional and mental adaptive processes
so that they will serve the evolutionary ends identified by the new “I”.
Assisted by mental modelling, the new “I” would use mental modelling to
identify the actions that would contribute most to the future evolutionary
success of humanity, and would manage the pre-existing processes to ensure that
the individual found motivation and satisfaction in taking those actions.
Pre-existing motivations, emotional responses, inculcated behaviours, beliefs
and habits of thinking would no longer prevent the individual doing what is
best in evolutionary terms. The new “I” would be capable of revising any
personality traits or behavioural predispositions that would otherwise stand in
the way of achieving evolutionary objectives.
The
new “I” would also use mental modelling of the individual’s mental processes to
search for ways to improve their operation. It would eliminate unproductive and
negative habits of thinking, and use mental models of the modelling process
itself to improve and adapt the modelling capacity (see, for example,
Heylighen, 1991).
In
general, the new “I” would be able to revise and recreate the individual’s
pre-existing adaptive processes continually through time to meet whatever
evolutionary challenges may arise. Humans who successfully worked on themselves
to undergo this metasystem transition would become self-evolving
beings—organisms that are able to adapt in whatever ways are necessary for
future evolutionary success, relatively unfettered by their biological past or
by their previous life experiences (Stewart, 2000).
Will
humans make the transition to become self-evolving beings? Will we develop the
capacity to consciously modify our pre-existing adaptive processes so that we
can take whatever actions are best for future evolutionary success?
The
key impediment to making this transition it that it is not easy. In the present
circumstances with current techniques and practices, significant personal
effort, commitment and perseverance is necessary if an individual is to make
the transition. For many, the prospect of being able to make a greater
contribution to the evolutionary success of humanity is unlikely to provide
sufficient motivation for the considerable investment required.
Nevertheless,
increasing numbers of individuals are likely to develop the ability to manage
their pre-existing adaptive processes, although not initially for evolutionary
purposes. This is because the acquisition of this ability can provide immediate
benefits to individuals. Individuals will be far more effective at achieving
their key goals if they have the ability to align their pre-existing adaptive
processes with those goals. They will be able to find satisfaction and
motivation in all the actions needed to achieve their goals. In contrast,
individuals who do not develop this psychological capacity are far less
effective at pursing their goals. They are not able to implement actions that
are not motivated and rewarded by their pre-existing processes, even though the
actions may be essential for achieving their goals. They are not be able to
revise personality traits or habits of thought that stand in the way of
achieving their goals.
The
advantages accruing to individuals who can manage their pre-existing processes
will increase progressively as humans get better at using mental models to
foresee the consequences of their actions. As knowledge accumulates, humans
will increasingly see situations in which the actions motivated by their
internal reward system are inconsistent with their goals. Increasingly their
mental modelling will be superior to their pre-existing adaptive systems at
identifying the best actions for achieving their goals.
The
advantages of self-management will manifest most clearly where humans strongly
compete with each other, such as in economic markets. Competition creates
winners and losers. Individuals who can use self-management to achieve their
competitive goals will have a significant competitive advantage. They will tend
to out-compete those who are unable to do so. And the gap will widen as
knowledge accumulates and modelling improves. The incentives for the
development of self-management will increase.
This
is exactly what is occurring in market-based economies. Economic success is
increasingly going to those who have some ability to self-manage. It is no
accident there is a rapidly growing demand from business for personal
development training and literature. Many corporations now train their
executives in practices such as Neuro-Linguistic Programming, meditation,
techniques designed to improve emotional intelligence and other self-development
practices.
The
spread of self-management skills is self-reinforcing. As well as the
demonstration effect, the higher the proportion of individuals who are able to
self-manage, the more those without the skills will be disadvantaged. Furthermore,
as self-management spreads, individuals will increasingly encounter situations
in which they will be called upon to behave as if they are self-managers. This
effect can be expected to be particularly strong within families. Children
brought up by self-managers will be continually subject to different demands
and expectations to those who are not. Increasingly humans will grow up and
operate in a social environment that demands and encourages a capacity for
self-management. Eventually, a psychological transformation that once required
enormous personal effort will occur routinely to many as they grow up amongst
others who have already undergone the transformation.
Once
an individual has undergone the psychological MST that enables self-management,
it is a very small step to use self-management for evolutionary objectives. The
individual will be able to adopt the aim of pursuing evolutionary success for
humanity without having to be a psychological altruist. This is because she
will be able to use the capacity for self-management to find psychological
satisfaction and motivation in whatever it takes to pursue evolutionary
success.
An
individual will be more likely to adopt evolutionary objectives once she can
mentally model (and therefore understand) the past psychological evolution of
humanity, and the future possibilities. This understanding will tend to
undermine the possibility that the individual could continue to find meaning in
a life spent pursuing only the satisfactions provided by their pre-existing
internal reward and motivation systems. The individual will see that these have
no absolute validity or value. They are past evolution’s best attempt to get us
to behave in ways that will bring evolutionary success. But they are a flawed
attempt that is inferior to what can be achieved when we supplement our
adaptive ability with mental modelling. The individual will see that she does
not have a choice about whether to pursue evolutionary objectives. The only
choice is whether to do so guided by incompetent and outdated means, or to do
so consciously, using the superior capacity of mental modelling. The individual
will see that humans who continue to be guided only by their pre-existing
reward and motivation systems are as absurd as a wind-up toy soldier that has
run into a wall and fallen onto its back, but continues to march, on and on.
In
summary, there are a number of factors and processes that can be expected to
encourage the emergence of a new psychological MST amongst humans. But whether
these influences will be sufficient to establish the transition widely amongst
humanity is not yet clear.
5. CONCLUSION
Humanity
is on the threshold of a major evolutionary transition.
Before
the transition humans are organisms whose behavioural goals are set ultimately
by their internal reward and motivation system. The internal rewards have been
established and tuned by natural selection and conditioning processes. As a
result, humans spend their lives pursuing proxies for evolutionary success.
Humans have the capacity to use mental models to predict the effects of
alternative actions on their environment. But they are largely limited to using
this capacity to discover the actions that are best for achieving internal
rewards. Humans do not use it for identifying and implementing adaptations that
are best in evolutionary terms. Before the transition, humans are largely
incapable of implementing behaviours that are inconsistent with their
pre-existing reward and motivation system, even where their mental modelling
reveals that the behaviours are far more adaptive in evolutionary terms. They
are unable to use the much superior potential of mental modelling to discover
the best adaptations.
If
humans make the evolutionary transition, they will no longer blindly pursue
internal rewards and motivations as ends in themselves. They will use their
mental models to identify and implement the actions that will contribute most
to the evolutionary success of humanity. By consciously managing their
pre-existing adaptive systems, they will ensure that they find satisfaction and
motivation in pursuing evolutionary objectives. They will no longer be
incapable of using the superior adaptive capability of mental modelling to
adapt their behavioural goals.
Humans
are currently part way through the transition. As our ability to model the
consequences of our behaviour improves, we are increasingly encountering
situations in which our mental modelling is superior to our internal reward
system at organising adaptive behaviour. We are beginning to develop the new
psychological software needed for us to implement the behaviour identified by
our mental models in these circumstances. But to develop a comprehensive
ability to do this, humans will need to undergo a psychological MST. We will need
to develop a new “I” or master that can manage our physical, emotional, and
mental adaptive systems to align their goals with evolutionary objectives. This
would enable us to revise the operation of these pre-existing processes so that
we could adapt in whatever ways are needed for evolutionary success. Humans
would become self-evolving beings, able to consciously choose to change our
adaptive goals, relatively unfettered by our biological past or by our
conditioning.
It
is too early to say with certainty that humanity will negotiate this transition
successfully. But it is clear that the unfolding of the transition will be
given impetus as humans become aware of the nature of the transition, its
significance in evolutionary terms, and their possible role in it.
I
gratefully acknowledge the benefit of useful comments from David Richards,
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