Velmans, Max (1995) The Limits of Neuropsychological Models of Consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)]
Full text available as:
HTML
13Kb |
Abstract
This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
---|---|
Keywords: | consciousness, functionalism, evolution, first person, third person, reductionism, neurophysiological models |
Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Neuroscience > Neurophysiology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 2 |
Deposited By: | Velmans, Professor Max, |
Deposited On: | 13 Mar 1998 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:53 |
Metadata
- ASCII Citation
- Atom
- BibTeX
- Dublin Core
- EP3 XML
- EPrints Application Profile (experimental)
- EndNote
- HTML Citation
- ID Plus Text Citation
- JSON
- METS
- MODS
- MPEG-21 DIDL
- OpenURL ContextObject
- OpenURL ContextObject in Span
- RDF+N-Triples
- RDF+N3
- RDF+XML
- Refer
- Reference Manager
- Search Data Dump
- Simple Metadata
- YAML
Repository Staff Only: item control page