Brown, Steven Ravett (2002) Must phenomenology rest on paradox? [Preprint]
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Abstract
Husserl made certain assumptions about the nature of the components of experienced phenomena derived from and similar to the assumptions of the psychologists of his time. I will present some of those assumptions, and argue, and support that argument with evidence, that they are incorrect. I claim that if that is true, then Husserlian methodology is flawed, to the extent that for certain investigations both the epoch? and the method of eidetic variation necessitate circularity which invalidates their utility. These arguments and some of their implications are presented in detail.
Item Type: | Preprint |
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Keywords: | Husserl, phenomenology, gestalts, cognition, Gurwitsch, philosophy of mind |
Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Epistemology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 2207 |
Deposited By: | Brown, Dr. Steven Ravett |
Deposited On: | 10 May 2002 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:54 |
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