Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both?

Velmans, Max (1990) Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? [Journal (Paginated)]

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What, in essence, characterizes the mind? According to Searle, the potential to be conscious provides the only definitive criterion. Thus, conscious states are unquestionably "mental"; "shallow unconscious" states are also "mental" by virtue of their capacity to be conscious (at least in principle); but there are no "deep unconscious mental states" - i.e. those rules and procedures without access to consciousness, inferred by cognitive science to characterize the operations of the unconscious mind are not mental at all. Indeed, according to Searle, they have no ontological status - they are simply ways of describing some interesting facets of purely physiological phenomena.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:Searle, connection principle, consciousness, functionalism, mind, first person, third person, aspectual shape, unconscious
Subjects:Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Epistemology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:245
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:13 Mar 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


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