Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics

Dennett, Daniel C. (1988) Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [Journal (Paginated)]

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In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer and myself, to name a few. This fainthearted consensus is all wrong, according to Fodor, whose new book is a vigorous--even frantic--defense of what he calls Intentional Realism: beliefs and desires are real, causally involved, determinately contentful states. "We have no reason to doubt," Fodor says, "that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire explanation." (p.16)

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Subjects:Philosophy > Logic
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:253
Deposited By: Dennett, Daniel
Deposited On:27 Mar 1998
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:53


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