Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity

Morton, Professor Adam (2003) Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity. [Preprint]

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I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:cognition, computational complexity, epistemology, epistemic virtue, metavirtue, virtue
Subjects:Computer Science > Complexity Theory
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Epistemology
ID Code:2886
Deposited By: Morton, Prof Adam
Deposited On:16 Apr 2003
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

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