Georgi Lazarov
Draft version September 2003
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Keywords: phenomenal consciousness, materialism, explanatory gap, functionalism, representationalism, aesthesionomy.
The topic of the essay is the “explanatory gap” between, on one side, descriptions of conscious states from 1st person perspective, termed as phenomenal (P-) consciousness; and on the other side, the descriptions of conscious states in representational theories of mind, from 3rd person perspective, termed as access (A-) consciousness. The main source of the explanatory gap between P-consciousness and A-consciousness is the methodology of functionalism, accepted in almost contemporary representational theories.
I argue for the following: (1) The principles of materialist ontology, accepted in representational theories of mind, are true. But materialism is not necessary linked with functionalist research methods. The only reasonable consequence from the existence of the “explanatory gap” is that functionalism should be replaced with more adequate methodological approaches. (2) One such non-functionalist approach, termed as “aesthesionomic approach”, is proposed. The central idea is that phenomenal conscious states should be first described in objective terms (from 3rd person perspective). Only on base of such a preliminary objective description of phenomenal conscious states, the description of representational mechanisms (able to realize these states) will not give rise to an “explanatory gap”.
Existence of consciousness is nowadays often characterized as an epistemological mystery in the field of materialism. Epistemological mystery is problem, in which we have no idea what could prove to be a solution, or what kind of an investigation is necessary in order to find a solution.
Parallel with materialism, new non-materialist ontological theories, aimed to ‘fit’ the data of contemporary science, are developed. Chalmers (2002) claims that at least three types of non-materialist ontological theories are actual alternatives to materialism:
– interactive dualism,
– epiphenomenalism, and
– panprotopsychism, i.e. the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties are located at the fundamental level of physical reality.
He concludes:
It is often held that even though it is
hard to see how materialism could be true, materialism must be true, since the
alternatives are unacceptable. As I see it, there are at least three prima
facie acceptable alternatives to materialism on the table, each of which is
compatible with a broadly naturalistic (even if not materialistic) worldview,
and none of which has fatal problems.
The non-materialist theories of mind have no problem with the explanation of consciousness. Why do we have to select as an ontological research framework the materialist view, the only one in whose scope consciousness seems to be a mystery?
Physics provides explicitly only one constraint over the ontological theories, namely the conservative laws. This argument is restricted only against the interactive dualism. And even the interactive dualism succeed to “fit” this constraint, by claiming that an immaterial mind could activate some neural response by “increasing the quantum probability” of some biochemical processes in the cerebral cortex “without interfering with the conservative laws of physics” (Eccles, 1994, p.11).
The contemporary opponents of materialism claim that scientific evidences against non-materialist ontological theories do not exist at all. Eccles (1994, p. ix) told sarcastically: “Materialists remain as dominant as ever because they are devotees of a dogmatic belief system, which holds them with a religious-like orthodoxy”.
My replay is that materialist ontology is based not only on data from neurophysiology, psychology and conservative laws of physics; materialism is a derivative of the entire system of contemporary science. We know from physics and chemistry that atoms and non-organic molecules, which build our bodies, have no mental properties. Cosmology presents us a history of the universe from the Big Bang till the present, and in this history there is no place for immaterial souls. In order to “add” immaterial souls to human brains (or protophenomenal properties to the fundament of the universe), one has first to change contemporary cosmology.
The general ontological debate on the nature of mind is not “closed”; but I claim that this general ontological debate must be separated from the debate about the consciousness in the scope of materialism, because the arguments used in the two debates are radically different.
In this essay I take as a given that human conscious experiences do arise (somehow) from physical and chemical processes in the human brain, and I consider only the further question: How and why does it happen?
According to agnostic materialism (called also “mysterialism”), there are good reasons to accept materialist ontology, but existence of consciousness will be forever a mystery. Human cognitive abilities possess some inherited limits making the scientific explanation of the mind impossible. Colin McGinn (1989/1997) introduced the term “cognitive closure”
A type of mind M is cognitively closed
with respect to a property P (or theory T) if and only if the concept-forming
procedures at M’s disposal cannot extend to grasp of P (or an understanding of
T). …
What is closed to the mind of a rat may be open to the mind of a monkey, and what is open to us may be closed to the monkey. Representational power is not all or nothing. Minds are biological products like bodies, and like bodies they come in different shapes and sizes more or less capacious; more or less suited to certain cognitive tasks.(p. 529-530)
We have to agree with McGinn that any mind, at any time is cognitively closed with respect to some aspects of reality. But the agnostic conclusion, made further by McGinn about the theories of mind, is wrong. The limits of concept-forming procedures are historically determinate. Some other problems were earlier also considered as unsolvable in field of materialism, but however people succeed in solving them. History of science contains ‘know-how’ for solving epistemological mysteries in materialist ontology, and we can use it by solving the problem of consciousness.
Let us consider briefly the problem of origin of life. We can point introspectively two features of living bodies, which had made the problem to appear as unsolvable until the end of XIX century.
The first feature is the complexity of living bodies. While trying to explain the “origin of life”, philosophers and biologists tried to explain how non-living particles could be linked together by some natural process in a complex body as a horse or a bird. Defenders of creationism claimed that such ‘natural process’ is impossible. The Development of the theory for the evolution of the species and the theory of cell building of living organism changed the view on what has to be explained in theories of the origin of life. The first few non-mysterious materialist theories of the origin of life, developed at the beginning of the XX century, were theories about the origin of simple one-cell organisms.
The second feature, which made the problem to be viewed as unsolvable, is the “teleological organization” of all processes in the living body. Immanuel Kant claimed in the "Critique of Teleological Judgement" ( Kant,1790 /1972, §77) that no human mind, neither any other possible finite mind, (i.e. anyone except Got) would be able to explain with physical causality the activity of a living body, even a simple one, like a grass. His argument was purely epistemological - physical causality gives explanations from the present to the future, but activity of any living body is dependent on the result in the future. It was not until the 1930s that biology accepted the simple concept of feedback control as sufficient for the elimination of the epistemological mystery of teleological organization of processes in living bodies.
Let us make a conclusion from this story. The epistemological mysteries were caused by some specific historical constraints on scientific knowledge. But scientific knowledge could be changed, and was changed in course of investigation; respectively the problem was demistificated. What was in 1800s beyond the cognitive limits, is today within the limits.
This conclusion seems trivial in retrospection, but it is very important in considering the problem of consciousness. Kant’s error by explanation of life was that he extrapolated over the future the historical constrains of science. Agnostic materialism makes the same error.
The plan of the essay is the following.
In section 2 I describe a version of materialism, which incorporates the ideas of (a) emergentism – the view that the mind is a system of emergent processes which supervene on neuronal processes in the brain.; and (b) representationalism - the view that the mind is a system creating representations of the environment, and thereby using these representations for control of behavior. I term this view “materialist emergent representationalism” (MER). I present MER schematically, in form of a small set of ontological and epistemological principles, without giving arguments for them. But the principles accepted in MER are not new, and for any of them could be found many arguments, given by many authors.
In section 3 I consider the explanatory gap between phenomenal psychology and the representational theories of consciousness. I maintain that the source of the gap is the methodology of functionalism, accepted in almost contemporary representational theories. But the materialist ontology is not necessary linked with functionalist research methods. Therefore, the only reasonable conclusion is that functionalism should be replaced with more adequate methodological approaches.
In sections 4 I present a non-functionalist approach, termed as “aesthesionomic approach”. The central idea is that phenomenal conscious states should be first described in objective terms (from 3rd person perspective). Only on base of such a preliminary objective description of phenomenal conscious states, the description of representational mechanisms (able to realize these states) will not give rise to an “explanatory gap”.
The aesthesionomic approach is not ontologically neutral. The principles of MER constitute its ontological framework.
In section 5 I analyze the relationship between the aesthesionomic approach and the various representational theories of consciousness is considered. The aesthesionomic approach is compatible with most of the contemporary representational theories of consciousness, if they are interpreted according the principles of materialist emergent representationalism.
Materialist emergent representationalism (MER) is termed a view on the nature of mind, based on the following ontological principles:
(MER 1) The general principle of materialism: The particles on the fundamental level in universe (sub-atom particles, atoms, and non-organic molecules) have no mental properties.
(MER 2)The principle of emergent representationalism: The mind is a system of emergent states and processes in the brain; i.e. mental states supervene on neuronal processes in brain, but can not be identified with neurophysiological processes, neither can be explained in terms of neurophysiology. The mind is an emergent system, which creates representations of environment and internal states of the living organism, and uses these representations for control of behavior.
(MER 3) The principle of the dual-coding organization of the human mind: Human representational system consists of two representational subsystems: depictive (nonverbal) representational subsystem and verbal representational subsystem. The depictive representational subsystem stems from an earlier evolutionary stage as verbal representation. It can exist within the absence of abilities for verbal representations. The existence of verbal representations presupposes the existence of depictive representations.
Terminological note: Within the verbal representational subsystem the representations are termed as propositional representations, thoughts or concepts. Within the depictive representational subsystem the representations are termed as depictive representations or mental images.
(MER 4) The anti-sensibilist principle Sensibility (the ‘feel’ ability) is not a fundamental property of the mind. The mind originates in biological evolution in the form of representational systems by which all mental states are unconscious states. Sensibility emerged as a subsequent mental ability. Conscious processes supervene on the primary (non-conscious) representational processes.
(MER 5) The principle of the multi-level organization of the science of mind: The entire system of scientific knowledge about the mental activity of the brain consists of several hierarchically subordinated levels of explanation. The processes on any higher level emerge from (supervene on) the processes at the lower level.
We have to distinguish at least five main levels of the explanation of the mind/brain:
L4. Level of conscious mind
L3. Level of primary (non-conscious)
representational states
L2. Neurophysiological level
L1. Biochemical /cytological level
L0. Fundamental
physical level
MER, as present above, has been in existence before the middle of XX century. The revolution in the science of the mind based on MER, during the second half of the XX century is linked with the development of information-processing theories of intentionality (IPTI). IPTI accepted some non-traditional ideas about the relationships between, on one side, intentionality and consciousness; and on the other side, intentionality and neuronal processes.
The kind of materialism, dominating till the middle of XX century, is the sensibilist materialism. This view comes from the French materialism of the XVIII century. According to the sensibilist materialism, the initial form of the mind is sentience (where sentience is the ability for simple conscious experiences). Respectively, any form of the mind has both intentional and phenomenal properties; any mind is a conscious mind.
According MER, in contrast with sensibilist materialism, the initial form of the mind is the non-conscious mind (primary representational systems) which has no kind of conscious experience. Respectively, fundamental theories of intentionality (theory of representational properties) could be developed independently of explanation of consciousness.
The separation of theories of intentionality from theories of consciousness does not mean that one has to explain the content of the conscious mind independent of consciousness. The conscious mind is a later result of the development of the mind. It constitutes a new set of emergent properties, which need additional explanation. Criticism against theories, trying to explain the content of consciousness by ignoring the phenomenal features of the conscious states, is presented by McGinn (1991 /1997). He pointed clearly that such theories imply the claim that conscious states are epiphenomena. MER is an anti-epiphenomenalist view. So we have to agree that “we cannot hope to devise an exhaustive theory of the nature of conscious content, while remaining neutral on whether such content is conscious” (McGinn, 1991 /1997; p. 300) According to MER, fundamental theories of intentionality should not explain the content of the conscious mind, but only the intentionality of primary (non-conscious) mind.
The second key idea in IPTI is about the question:
Which aspect
of neuronal processes in the brain is essential for intentionality?
The traditional answer in materialism is that some substantial feature, specific to the brain, is necessary for intentionality. The problem of this view is, that neuronal cells have nearly the same biochemical and physiological features as any other kind of cells.
In second half of the XX century, in contrast with the traditional view, the idea, that intentionality can be explained relatively independent from the specific substantial features of neuronal cells in brain was developed. We can consider the brain as a linked set of abstract automata, described only in terms of inputs, outputs, internal states and transformation functions. Such description in terms of formal theory of automata is termed “abstract neuronal network” (ANN). The idea is that any aspect of the physiology of the brain, which is significant for intentionality, could be presented in the description of ANN. Physical and chemical properties of neuronal cells are important only as far as they realize some features of an ANN.
(MER 6) The principle of information-processing theories of intentionality: Intentionality supervenes only on such features of neurophysiological processes in the brain, which could be presented by descriptions of the brain in terms of abstract neuronal networks.
Any ANN could, in principle, be realized in physically different systems. So an ontological consequence from IPTI is:
(MER 7) The Principle of multi-realization: Two representational systems (minds) could be equivalent, but realized in physically different systems.
The principles of MER have a restrictive role by development of IPTI.
First, many claims in IPTI are based on results, deduced first in the classical computational theories. But the results from classical computational theories can not be implemented immediately in research activity of the brain. Brains are not realizations of Von Neumann machines. The results from classical computational theories can be applied nowadays by research of brain, only as far as we have theories, which can prove the validity of these results for ANN.
Second, there is a broad class of computational theories of intentionality, popular in the second half of the XX century, which is refuted in MER. Let us call this class of theories, following Georges Rey (1997), Computational-Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT). CRTT is based on the idea that all mental representations could be considered as propositions in some unified Language of Thought (LOT). Ray (1997) writes:
It presupposes to capture the attitudes
states by positing different relations born by the agent to sentences in a
special language; called “language of thought” (
According to MER, the idea of
The development of IPTI has an important influence on the general architecture of the science of mind/brain in the field of MER, presented schematically on fig 1.
|
L4. Level of conscious mind |
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L3 Level of primary
(non-conscious) representational states L3a. Intentional level L3b. Computational
level |
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L2. Neurophysiological level |
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L1. Biochemical /cytological level |
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L0. Fundamental physical level |
The level of primary (non-conscious) representational states (L3) takes central place in this system of theories. The primary representational processes, on one side, supervene on neuronal processes; on the other side, they give rise to the conscious processes.
Sublevel L3a (the intentional level) includes the information-processing theories of intentionality (IPTI).. Theories of intentionality are essentially theories of mind, and belong to psychology; even most of researchers in this area do not call themselves “psychologists”. An interesting discussion on river contemporary theories on intentionality is present in Clapin (2002)
Sublevel L3b (the computational level) includes two kinds of research: development of theories of abstract neuronal networks and the application of these theories by description of neurophysiological processes. The former kind of research belongs merely to the mathematical theory of automata. The later kind of research is often considered as part of neurosciences and is termed as computational neurophysiology.
According to MER, conscious states supervene on primary intentional states. Explanations of consciousness, based immediately on the neurophysiological or computational levels, are impossible.
Let summarize.
The term materialist
emergent representationalism (MER) is used here in order to distinguish the
described above view from alternative materialist and non-materialist
ontological views on mind. The broad terms “materialism”, “emergentism” and
“representationalism” denote some aspect of this ontological view, however, not
all views on mind, which could be characterized as “materialist” and “emergentist” and
“representationalist”, do belong to MER.
I use the cover term phenomenological psychology for any scientific research of the mind based on the 1st person (subjective) perspective.
The introspective psychology of the XIX century is the historically first form of phenomenological psychology. In the first decades of the XX century, many psychological schools – the “structural psychology”, “functional psychology”, “Gestalt-psychology” and others - refuted the introspective methodology and replaced it with other methodological principles, but they continued to be based on data from the 1st person (subjective) perspective.
In the second half of XX century, the borderlines between the psychological schools became fuzzier and phenomenological psychology could be considered as (more or less) integrated research area.
Psychological theories intended to explain the mind from the 3rd person (objective) perspective were developed only in the last forty years. This new area of psychological research was called cognitive psychology. The historical roots of cognitive psychology are in the theories of intelligence from first half of the XX century, and some versions of “purposive behaviorism”.
Cognitive psychology is not restricted to ‘cognitive processes’, as distinguished from other kinds of mental processes (‘perceptive processes’, ‘mnemonic processes’, ‘voluntary processes’ - as these terms are used in classical psychological schools). In the first monographic work, published under the title “Cognitive psychology”, Neisser (1965) marks explicitly the untraditional, extended use of the term “cognition”:
As used here, the term ‘cognition’
refers to all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, elaborated,
stored, recovered, and used. It is concerned with these processes, even when
they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and
hallucinations. ... [G]iven such a sweeping definition,
it is apparent, that cognition is involved in everything a human being might
possibly do; that every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon.
In cognitive psychology, like in phenomenological psychology, the subject matter of research are all mental states and processes - conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary, linguistic or non-linguistic. It differs only on its goal, all mental processes to be described in objective terms, i.e. in terms defined from 3rd person perspective.
In cognitive psychology, the mind is described as a representational system (or representational mechanism). Therefore the cognitive theories are termed also as representational theories.
The most difficult problem occurring with representational theories is explanation of conscious states. In this essay I use a terminological proposal, made by Block (1995 / 1997) and accepted nowadays by many authors. We will distinguish:
- A-conscious state - states in the representational mechanism, distinguished by objective criteria, defined as conscious states in some representational theory of mind. “A-” stands for “accesses” or “availability”. The most often used objective criterion for distinguishing conscious from unconscious states in contemporary representational theories of mind is, that conscious states are directly available for global control; or equivalently, that global control process has access to them.
-
P-conscious
states – conscious experiences, as subjectively experienced, and as
described in phenomenological psychology. “P-”
stands for “phenomenal”.
Using this terminology, we can tell that if a representational theory of human mind is developed correctly, then A-conscious states must be identical with P-conscious states. The problem is that such identification is impossible by contemporary representational theories.
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L4. Level of conscious mind |
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Cognitive psychology |
The explanatory gap |
Phenomenological psychology |
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L3 Level of primary
(non-conscious) representational states L3a. Intentional level L3b. Computational
level |
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L2. Neurophysiological level |
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L1. Biochemical /cytological level |
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L0. Fundamental physical level |
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By identification of A-conscious states with P-conscious states seems to be left an explanatory gap as deep, as the explanatory gap existing in psychophysical identity theories of the 1950s-1980s.
Block (1995/1997) accented on the fact that, by many contemporary representational theories, A-conscious states are so defined, that they do not correlate well with P-conscious states. But this is not the crux of the problem. The identification of P-consciousness with A-consciousness leaves the connection between them mysterious, even if they are in perfect correlation. Chalmers (1997) writes:
One of the most interesting projects in
this area is that of modifying the concept of A-consciousness in such a way as
to make it plausible that A-consciousness (in the modified sense) and
P-consciousness are perfect correlates. (p. 421)
The picture is this (1) we know that
availability goes along with experience; (2) we empirically discover that some
mechanism plays the central role in the availability process. ... Of course,
the story about the mechanism does not alone explain P-consciousness, as we still have not explained why
availability always goes along with experience; we have simply taken for
granted that it does. (p. 422)
According MER, P-consciousness and A-consciousness are two descriptions of one and the same thing. Therefore, a representational theory of consciousness can not stop at the claim that “availability always goes along with experience “. If the identification is impossible, then there are some errors in the methods we use by investigation and description of consciousness:
(a) errors in the methods of cognitive psychology – by description of A-consciousness;
and /or
(b) errors in the methods of phenomenological psychology – by description of P-consciousness.
The approach for objective description of mind, dominating in contemporary cognitive psychology, is the functional approach or functionalism. Shoemaker (1981/ 1997,p. 649) characterized functionalism as “the view that mental states are definable in terms of their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioral outputs and other mental states”.
In a functional theory of mind, all mental terms could be defined recursively (without ‘circular’ definitions), where primary objective terms are the non-mental terms, in which the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs are described, and some objective terms describing causal relations.
Allan Paivio (1986, p.34) proposed a more expressive name for this research approach: behavioral mentalism. He characterized it as the approach by which the mind is “constructed from observations of the behavior of others”. In a broad scientific context, the term behavioral mentalism is better, but here I will use the term functionalism, which is more popular in contemporary science of mind.
It is plane, that functionalism can assure that descriptions of mind are in objective terms. The problem is, could functional approach fit the requirements of cognitive psychology. Let’s repeat that in cognitive psychology objective descriptions of all kinds of mental processes in all aspects – including conscious experiences are needed.
Functionalism “solves” the problem of conscious experiences by refuting the validity of any argument based on data from phenomenological psychology. It is assumed (some times explicitly postulated) the following claim, which I will term as anti-phenomenological thesis.
Phenomenological psychology (and any knowledge of the mind based on the 1st person perspective) is an invalid source of knowledge.
A typical articulation of this principle is presented, for example, by Pylyshyn (1989):
Subjective experience has been a notoriously misleading source of evidence for what goes in the mind! Research of human information processing release countless processes that clearly must be occurring ... of which we have little or no subjective awareness. (p.61)
We have to agree that there are countless perceptive processes “of which we have little or no subjective awareness”. But subjective experiences also belong to what “goes in the mind”! And they couldn’t be explained, while phenomenological data are ignored.
Accepting the anti-phenomenological thesis, functionalism modifies the epistemological rules by research of mind. It turns out, that what is explained in functional theories, is all that has to be explained in cognitive psychology. According to functionalism, there is no place for explanatory gap between A-consciousness and P-consciousness. If something from P-consciousness is left unexplained, this is defined as “cognitive error” or “pre-scientific prejudice” of phenomenological psychology.
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L4. Level of conscious mind |
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Cognitive psychology |
The task of clarification |
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L3 Level of primary
(non-conscious) representational states L3a. Intentional level L3b. Computational level |
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L2. Neurophysiological level |
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L1. Biochemical /cytological level |
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L0. Fundamental physical level |
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Analyzing the restrictions of functional approach, Ned Block and Jerry Fodor (1972 /1986) formulate the following anti-functionalist thesis:
A theory, which fails to capture the
structural relations within and among psychological states, is overwhelmingly
unlikely to arrive at a description
adequate for the purposes of theoretical psychology. (p.97)
Anti-functionalism is per se not ontological or epistemological view of the mind. Refuting functional theories of mind, researchers take different position according the question, what is the best alternative. The arguments against functionalism are often used as arguments against materialism. .
According to MER, the mind can in principle be described objectively. But MER is not necessarily linked with functionalism. The only reasonable consequences from refuting functionalism are:
(1) If functional approach is not good enough, we have to replace it with more adequate methods for objective description of the conscious mind.
(2) A method of objective description of the mind could be more useful as a functional method, only if by this method the data from phenomenological psychology are accounted.
The aesthesionomic approach, proposed below, points a way in which phenomenological knowledge could be used by objective descriptions of the mind. To accept a non-functionalist approach does not mean to accept epiphenomenalism. In opposite, it is the functionalist approach that makes consciousness to seem as an epiphenomenon.
In research of mind, based on the functional approach, the development of representational theory of consciousness is separated into two phases. With the first phase, on basis of observations of inputs and outputs some kind of representational system is constructed, which can explain the behavior. During the second phase, an objective criterion for ‘consciousness’ is defined; by this criterion a subset of representational states (A-conscious states), which correspond with conscious experiences (P-conscious states) is separated.
The source of the explanatory gap is that the link between the representational mechanism and the phenomenological facts is additionally ascribed; the link is not an internal feature of the representational mechanism. With the functional approach, the researcher “fits” phenomenological descriptions like a child throwing snowballs. The child first throws the ball. After seeing where the ball fell, the child tells “I succeed! This was the exact target I wanted!”
Now I will present an approach for objective description of the conscious mind, differing from the functional approach. The central idea is that we need first to develop some objective description of subjective experiences. Only then could we look for representational mechanism, which would realize the previously described conscious states.
The development of theory of representational systems with conscious states is divided in two phases, solving two relative separated problems.
Phase 1. (Aesthesionomic analysis)
Description of P-conscious states in objective representational terms
Let’s term the objective description of P-conscious states - OP-conscious states.
OP-conscious states be described in objective representational terms (neither in physical and neurophysiological terms, nor in mysterious spiritualist mental terms). But the objective description must not explain the representational mechanisms.
The aesthesionomic analysis has the goal of developing intermediate kind of objective descriptions, which to realize conceptual link between:
- descriptions of representational systems, developed in theories of cognitive psychology (“A-conscious states”) and
- phenomenological descriptions of conscious experiences, developed in theories of phenomenological psychology (“P-conscious states”).
Respectively, OP-conscious states must be expressed in some more general set of representational terms, relatively independent from the terminology of concrete representational mechanisms.
Phase 2. (Constructive analysis)
During the second phase, a representational mechanism must be determinate, which would be able to realize the previously described OP-conscious states. Respectively, the aesthesionomic description must be translated in terms of the concrete representational mechanism, i.e. in terms of A-conscious states.
The task in the second phase belongs to the research area of cognitive psychology. But the aesthesionomic analysis forms a specific (and relatively separated) research area, which we could term as aesthesionomy. The place of aesthesionomy in the general architecture of science of mind/brain is present on fig. 4
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L4. Level of conscious mind |
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Cognitive psychology {A-conscious
states}<==> |
Aesthesionomy {OP-conscious states} |
Phenomenological psychology |
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L3 Level of primary
(non-conscious) representational states L3a. Intentional level L3b. Computational
level |
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L2. Neurophysiological level |
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L1. Biochemical /cytological level |
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L0. Fundamental physical level |
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(Note: ‘<==>’ stands for identity . )
Cognitive psychology studies the conscious mind from the 3rd person (objective) perspective; i.e. as A-conscious states.
Phenomenological psychology studies the conscious mind from the 1st person (subjective) perspective; i.e. as P-conscious states.
Aesthesionomy has the task to explicate this specific relationship between A-conscious states and P-conscious states. Note that P-conscious states also do not emerge from (do not supervene on) A-conscious states. P-consciousness and A-consciousness are two kinds of descriptions of one and the same real processes in human brain.
In field of aesthesionomy an interface methodology must be develop, by which knowledge from the 1st person (subjective) perspective could be translated into knowledge from the 3rd person (objective) perspective, and visa versa.
The goal of aesthesionomy is the development of objective descriptions of conscious experiences. How could we decide, whether a description of conscious experiences is objective? It seems that whatever we have said about conscious experiences comes from the 1st person (subjective) perspective.
Tomas Nagel (1974 /1997), analyzing the problem of
conscious experiences, pointed out that it could be helpful to be developed “an
objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy”. He pointed the following
criterion for objectivity:
[I]ts goal
would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences
in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences. (p
525)
We can use Nagel’s criterion for objectivity after some modification. The main criteria for validity of aesthesionomic descriptions of experiences are: (i) The descriptions must be comprehensible to subjects capable of conceptual thinking, but incapable of having those experiences. (ii) The descriptions must be expressed in terms of realizable representational mechanisms.
For example, an objective theory of color vision must be expressed in such a way, that a scientist with achromatic vision must be able to understand the theory exactly in the same degree, as a scientist with normal color vision.
In last twenty years the following mental experiment, proposed by Frank Jackson (1982), is often discussed. Mary is a human with normal color vision, living all her life in a black-and-white room. She is educated through black-and-white books and trough lectures relayed on black-and-white television. She is a brilliant expert in science of color vision. She knows (or could learn) everything from neurophysiology, psychology, physics, chemistry, and other scientific areas, what could be needed in order to understand the nature of color vision. The key question is: What is the new knowledge, which Mary acquires, when she is let out of the black-and-white room, or is given a color television?
Let us first answer the question whether Mary (before her release) could understand an aesthesionomic description of color vision. The answer is YES. An aesthesionomic description must be such that Mary could fully understand it. A theory of color vision, which needs demonstration of colors in order to be understood, is not an objective theory. We could use Mary as a prefect tester for aesthesionomic descriptions. If she understands an aesthesionomic description better after her release, then the description is not strictly in objective terms.
Now let us consider the “Knowledge Argument” against the possibility objective descriptions of phenomenal conscious states to be developed, as it is presented by Jackson (1986 / 1997, p. 568):
(1)’
Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about
other people.
(2)’
Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about other
people (because she learns something
about them on her release).
Therefore:
(3)’
There are truths about other people (and herself)
which escape the physical story.
From
(3)’
[T]he knowledge argument claims that Mary would not know what the relevant experience is like. What she could imagine is another matter. If her knowledge is defective, despite being all to know according to physicalism, then physicalism is false, whatever her power of imagination. (p. 569-570)
Such concepts, which are strongly linked with the ability of a person to have the corresponding experiences, are called by many authors “phenomenal concepts”. For example, Tye (2000) writes:
The
person who lacks the capacity to feel pain does not posses the phenomenal
concept of pain though she may
acquire a nonphenomenal concept of pain. (p. 26)
Likewise,
it is the case of the phenomenal concept red,
a concept that is exercised when one becomes aware via introspection of what it
is like to experience red. Possession of the concept requires that one knows
what it is like to experience red.(p. 27)
The knowledge of Mary (before her release) is “defective” because of lack of phenomenal concepts.
The objection against the Knowledge Argument is not based on ignorance of phenomenal concepts. The error in the Knowledge Argument is in the following implicit assumption:
A
person X could fully understand the conscious experience of other person Y,
only if X has the same concepts, which Y has. Consequently, X must have also
all phenomenal concepts, which Y has.
Phenomenal concepts belong to what has to be described in objective terms. An aesthesionomic theory must include an objective description of the experience of red; so it must include also an objective description of the phenomenal concept ‘red’. Mary must know the fact that normal people have phenomenal concept ‘red’, based on their experiences of redness. She has to know the structure of the Color Space possessed by humans with normal color vision, and which area of the Color Space is typically covered by the concept ‘red’. Perhaps she has to know also the different scopes of the phenomenal concepts ‘red’ in different cultures, described for example, by Hardin (1988).
However, we have to agree that after learning a perfect aesthesionomic theory of color vision, a color-blind men will continue to be unable to have chromatic color experiences, and also unable to have the corresponding phenomenal concepts. But it must not be evaluated as a “defect” of the theory. The aesthesionomic theories of color vision are not intended to be used as a therapeutic method.
Aesthesionomy could not establish conceptual link between anyone cognitive theory and anyone phenomenological theory. The ability of creating aesthesionomic descriptions depends on the ontological views of conscious mind, on which the theories are based. If descriptions of conscious states in representational system (A-conscious states) are based on one ontological view, and descriptions of the same conscious states in phenomenological theory (P-conscious states) are based on another, then conceptual link between both theories is impossible.
By aesthesionomic approach, the considered cognitive and phenomenological theories must be interpreted on basis of one and the same ontological view about the conscious states. The ontological principles of MER are not enough to assure a unified ontological view of the conscious mind. Nowadays in field of MER many rival views on consciousness are developed.
In next section I consider the compatibility of aesthesionomic approach with the different types of views.
The aesthesionomic approach could be summarized in the following methodological principles:
(AA 1) The explanation of conscious experiences has to be divided into two phases, with relative separated tasks: (i) Descriptive phase (aesthesionomic analysis), in which the subjective phenomena must be described in objective representational terms. (ii) Constructive phase, in which a representational mechanism able to realize the described conscious states must be determined.
(AA 2) The main criteria for validity of aesthesionomic descriptions of experiences are: (i) The descriptions must be comprehensible to subjects capable of conceptual thinking, but incapable of having those experiences. (ii) The descriptions must be expressed in terms of realizable representational mechanisms.
(AA 3) The considered cognitive and phenomenological theories must be interpreted on basis of one and the same ontological view about the conscious states.
Aesthesionomy could not be absolutely independent of cognitive psychology. By objective descriptions of conscious experiences we will always be restricted from our knowledge about what is possible to be realized in a representational mechanism. On the other side, by development of representational theories we will always be restricted from the knowledge about what must be realized in a representational mechanism. Such twofold dependence exists also in many other domains of scientific investigation. The development in the one field of study normally stimulates (but it could also block) the development in the other one.
Let us consider a classification of representational theories of consciousness, used by many contemporary authors.
Fist, there are distinguished:
- First-order representation (FOR) theories, and
- Higher-order representation (HOR) theories.
According the FOR theories, all representation states are phenomenal conscious states. (If there is some difference, it is merely in degree, as in quality.) Respectively, any representational system (mind) is conscious (in some degree).
In HOR theories it is accepted that some kind of relationship between higher-order representations and lower-order representations is important for existence of conscious states. However, HOR theories do not build a uniform view on consciousness
In scope of HOR theories, are distinguished:
- Verbal HOR, termed also Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories,
- Depictive HOR, termed also Higher- order Perception (HOP) theories.
According to the HOT theories, the higher-order representations, in virtue of which conscious states exist, are verbal (conceptual) representations.
According to the HOP theories, conscious states exist in virtue of some specific organization of nonverbal (depictive) representational system. Abilities for conscious representation (a) arise by animals before the abilities for verbal (conceptual) thinking, and (b) could exist by a lack of conceptual thinking. In HOP theories, the “inner sense” (or “inner scanner”) metaphor is often used; but by most authors it is just a metaphor and noting more.
In the scope of HOR, by another criterion, two kinds of theories are distinguished:
- dispositionalist HOR theories, and
- actualist HOR theories.
According the dispositionalist HOR theories, conscious states are the lower-order representational states, in virtue of being disposed (potentially accessible) for higher-order representations. It is not necessary that conscious states are actually represented in some higher-order representation. The existence of new futures in the potentially accessible representations on the lower level is often explained in terms of “consumer semantic”.
According the actualist HOR theories, a conscious state exists only if a lower-order state is actually represented in a higher-order state.
Respectively, are distinguished:
- actualist HOT and dispositionalist HOT theories;
- actualist HOP and dispositionalist HOP theories.
The classes of theories, distinguished in this classification are present schematically on fig 6.
|
HOR (Higher-order representation) |
FOR (First-order representation) |
|||
|
HOT (verbal HOR) |
HOP (depictive HOR) |
|||
|
Actualist |
Dispositionalist HOT |
Actualist HOP |
Dispositionalist HOP |
|
|
For
example: Rosenthal (1990/ 1997) |
For
example: Carruthers (2000) |
For
example: Lycan (2002) |
For
example: Tye (2000) |
For
example: Dretske (1995) |
The differentiation between dispositionalist HOT and actualist HOT theories is nowadays popular, thanks the works of Carruthers. But dispositionalist HOP theories are often conflated with FOR theories. Let us try to classify Tye’s theory of consciousness. According to Tye’s theory, conscious representations are these, which have ‘phenomenal content’. And ‘phenomenal content’ is characterized as PANIC – poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional content. Unconscious states could also have “abstract, non-conceptual, intentional content”. So the characteristic, which makes a difference, is “poised”. Tye (1990/1997, p.338) describes this property as follow:
The claim that contents relevant to phenomenal character of pains (and other sensory experiences) must be poised is to be understood as requiring that these contents attach to the output representations of the relevant sensory module(s) and stand ready and in position to make a direct impact on the belief/desire system.
According to Tye, representational states are conscious only if they “stand ready and in position to make a direct impact on” some second-order representational process. But it is not necessary that these representational states to be actually represented in “the belief/desire system”. It is exactly the idea of dispositionalist HOR.
Is it a verbal HOR or a depictive (nonverbal) HOR theory?
Tye uses the words “concepts”, “beliefs” and “desires” without strong links to verbal representations. Therefore, while Tye is considering human consciousness, this question can not be answered. We must find out what Tye claims explicitly about the mind of animals, where verbal representations do not exist. In the last chapter of his new book (Tye, 2000 p.177), he writes about the representation systems of fishes:
[I]t seems to me very plausible to
suppose that fish form simple beliefs on the basis of immediate, sensory
representations of their environments. And this certainly is the sense of
“belief” I was assuming when I claimed that phenomenal states must be poised to
make a direct impact on beliefs and/or desires. So, fish are the subjects of
states with PANIC. They are phenomenally conscious.
Now we can conclude that Tye’s theory, at least in the version presented in (Tye, 2000), is a dispositionalist depictive HOR theory, i.e. dispositionalist HOP theory.
Any representational theory of consciousness in field of MER is compatible with the aesthesionomic approach. But not all classes of representational theories, considered above, belong to MER.
According to MER, on primary level of representation, all representational states are unconscious states. Consequently, the FOR theories do not belong to MER.
Outside of scope of MER are also the actualist HOT theories. Paradigmatic examples of conscious states in MER are the conscious perceptive states (“that what we see in front of us”); i.e. depictive (nonverbal, non-conceptual) representational states.
In scope of MER, and respectively compatible with the aesthesionomic approach, are the following three classes of theories:
- dispositionalist HOP,
- actualist HOP,
- dispositionalist HOP.
According to MER, conscious states exist in virtue of specific structure of representations. It must include at least three components: (i) representation of Self, i.e. the organism, as distinguished from the environment; (ii) representation of Objects, distinguishable from other objects and Self; (iii) representation of Self-Objects relations. Let us term such three-component representations as Self-Objects differentiating (SOD-) representations. Conscious states are depictive SOD-representations.
Damasio (1999) presents a detailed theory about the evolution of nonverbal representational systems, able to make Self-Object differentiation. He does not consider the question about the link between self-object differentiation and phenomenal-conscious states. The presented evolutionary theory could be interpreted in context of HOP theories, but also in context of dispositionalist HOT theories.
The principles of MER left open the question, whether the
abilities for depictive SOD-representations arise in ontogeny (and phylogeny)
before verbal abilities (as it is claimed in HOP theories), or they are
developed together with the verbal abilities (as it is claimed in dispositionalist
HOT theories)
|
HOR (Higher-order representation) |
FOR (First-order representation) |
|||
|
HOT (verbal HOR) |
HOP (depictive HOR) |
|||
|
Actualist |
Dispositionalist HOT |
Actualist |
Dispositionalist HOP |
|
|
|
Representational
theories of consciousness in field of MER; i.e.
compatible with the aesthesionomic approach |
|
||
|
P-conscious
states are considered as depictive Self-Objects-differentiating
(SOD-) representations. |
||||
The root of the problem of consciousness is the “explanatory gap” between, on one side, phenomenological descriptions of conscious states (P-consciousness), and on the other side, the descriptions of conscious states in representational theories of mind (A-consciousness). The main source of the explanatory gap is the methodology of functionalism. One non-functionalist approach, termed “aesthesionomic approach”, is proposed.
According to the aesthesionomic approach, conscious states should be first described in objective terms (from 3rd person perspective). Only on base of such a preliminary objective description of phenomenal conscious states, the description of representational mechanisms (able to realize these states) will not give rise to an “explanatory gap”.
The aesthesionomic approach is not ontologically neutral. It is based on the ontological and epistemological principles of materialist emergent representationalism (MER).
I maintain that the ontological principles of MER (MER 1-7, in section 2) and the methodological principles of the aesthesionomic approach (AA 1-3 in section 4) are enough for determination of a framework, in scope of which consciousness could be investigated without epistemological mysteries.
But avoiding the
mystery in a problem area is
different from solving the problem. The
elimination of epistemological obstacles is a necessary preliminary condition
for solving a problem; but despite its importance, it is only a small part of
the solution.
Let us consider again the problem about the origin of life. Nowadays we know that the life arises in form of one-cell organisms; we know that feedback control processes could explain all “teleological” properties of primary organisms. This knowledge eliminates the epistemological obstacles in the field of research of life, but it is not, per se, a solution to the problem. Biologists continue to have difficulties in the development of theories dealing with the origin of life.
In case of the problem of consciousness we have to expect the same situation. The elimination of epistemological obstacles in scientific research of consciousness is important; and it could be done now. But explanation of consciousness will continue to be an open problem.
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