Atkinson, Anthony P. and Davies, Martin (1995) Consciousness without conflation. [Journal (Paginated)]
Full text available as:
HTML
8Kb |
Abstract
Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
Commentary on: | Block, Ned (1996) On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. [Preprint] |
---|---|
Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
Keywords: | consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, experience, cognitive psychology, information processing, dispositions |
Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 334 |
Deposited By: | Atkinson, Anthony P. |
Deposited On: | 24 Jun 1998 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:53 |
Commentary/Response Threads
-
Block, Ned
On A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. (deposited 08 Dec 1997)
- Guzeldere, Guven and Aydede, Murat On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. (deposited 15 Jul 1998)
- Atkinson, Anthony P. and Davies, Martin Consciousness without conflation. (deposited 24 Jun 1998) [Currently Displayed]
Metadata
- ASCII Citation
- Atom
- BibTeX
- Dublin Core
- EP3 XML
- EPrints Application Profile (experimental)
- EndNote
- HTML Citation
- ID Plus Text Citation
- JSON
- METS
- MODS
- MPEG-21 DIDL
- OpenURL ContextObject
- OpenURL ContextObject in Span
- RDF+N-Triples
- RDF+N3
- RDF+XML
- Refer
- Reference Manager
- Search Data Dump
- Simple Metadata
- YAML
Repository Staff Only: item control page