Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?

Tirassa, Maurizio (1994) Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems? [Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)]

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Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.

Item Type:Journal (On-line/Unpaginated)
Keywords:Consciousness; Artificial intelligence; Robots; Control systems; Evolution
Subjects:Biology > Animal Cognition
JOURNALS > Psycoloquy
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
ID Code:3557
Deposited By: Tirassa, Prof. Maurizio
Deposited On:07 Apr 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

References in Article

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Bringsjord, S. (1992) What robots can and can't be. Boston: Kluwer Academic.

Bringsjord, S. (1994) Précis of: What robots can and can't be. PSYCOLOQUY 5(59) robot-consciousness.1. bringsjord.

Harnad, S. (1991) Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines 1:43-54.

Newell, A. (1990) Unified theories of cognition. Boston: Harvard University Press.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1984) Computation and cognition. Boston: MIT Press.

Searle, J.R. (1992) The rediscovery of the mind. Boston: MIT Press.

Turing, A.M. (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind 59:433-460.


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