Book Review
Sins of the modern cognitive
neuroscience: conceptual confusions, mereological fallacy, and modified Cartesianism
Andres Soosaar
Department of Physiology, University of Tartu, Estonia
Max R. Bennett and Peter M. S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Blackwell Publishing (2003), xvii + 461 pp., $39.95 (paperback).
To put formally, M.R. Bennett (a physiologist) and P.M.S. Hacker (a
philosopher) have released a voluminous attempt to reconceptualize
the grounds of scientific understanding of mental issues through organism (sic!
organism, not brain) functioning. The book is structured to four main parts
covering wide area of analysis from conceptual and historical roots of brain
functioning through human mental faculties and consciousness to their own methodological
considerations to issues of neuroscientific research
functioning and two appendices presenting their attitude to the philosophy of mind
of Daniel Dennett and John Searle. In introduction of the book the reader is
suggested to take this approach as a quite unusual effort to manage general
questions of cognitive neuroscience. This is very much so, because they try to
analyze existing scientific concepts theoretically without any real empirical
support. They try to find contradictions, misconceivings,
misusings of fundamental notions, concepts and
hypotheses in scientific study of mind and have discovered tens of different more
or less serious conceptual misdoings which would be necessary to make up to get
right track for real progress in cognitive neurosciences. In this point it is quite difficult to
imagine how scientists can proceed the way of conceptual correction as science
doesn’t like so much to rewrite past, accept the pure force of traditions, and
at the same time science cannot for several reasons perform forced conceptual
unification of the field. Interestingly, after reading the book I started to
think that by reading of the book another order of chapters may make its understanding
of the book easier: it would be good to jump after the first history part to the
end of book, methodological section (Part IV) and appendices which express
authors original positions in a more open way and afterwards turn back to the
analyses of human mental issues and performance (Part II & III).
The roots and early development of neuroscience are written in a way to
present together both ideological and empirical understandings of neural and
mental functioning (Part I). They divided conceptual history into Aristotelian
and Cartesian period and their own sympathy clearly belongs to Aristotle and
his approach of psuchç
as “the general principle of animal life”. The authors’ main concern in the
history and development of neuroscience has been deep and modifying Cartesianism of eminent scientists until very recent times.
Yes, it is possible to accuse scientists from conceptual basis, but scientists
and science have followed their own route on the basis of both conviction and
social circumstances which may be different from philosophical prescriptions.
Here we clearly meet a fundamental question about the role of philosophy in
development of knowledge and authors have chosen more conservative strategy to
hold philosophy and science separately as much it is nowadays possible. Such
separation gives sometimes unexpected situations when philosophical
contributions cannot fit very well with real scientific practice and
expectations.
Methodologically authors express very clear and broad (if not total)
antireductionist position (Part IV,
According to authors another big mistake of current neuroscience is a mereological fallacy which mainly means impossibility to
bind cognitive and conscious performance with brain. They say that there is a
new form of Cartesianism, the brain-body distinction
or crypto-Cartesianism, which is not proper way to
follow for neuroscience. No doubt, this point is and will remain a big
conflicting issue between their foundations of neuroscience and real
neuroscience, as very big part of neuroscience hopes to derive the truth about
brain functioning and cognition as well from multilevel structuring of whole
organism and its central nervous system. Such more holistic approach makes life
difficult in neurosciences, because empirical tools of investigation seems to
be per se more appropriate and successful not in whole spectrum of existence
but in smaller fragment of it as they are not able to collect simultaneously
all aspects of the object under research. Natural and life sciences have
practiced a long time a destructive way of cognition in a sense that
understanding of the issue has been got through simplification and reducing of
complexity. Authors have summarized their own methodological approach as
follows, “One primary method of dissolving conceptual puzzlement is the careful
examination and description of the use of words – of what competent speakers,
using words correctly, do and do not say.” (400) and “Philosophy, by contrast
(to science, reviewer’s addition), clarifies what does and does not make sense”
(401). Those methodological considerations nicely explain why these
philosophical foundations of neuroscience and neuroscience itself could not
find mutual understanding, because science clearly prioritizes object of study
and after that the way how to speak about that. Furthermore, science has not
been so rigid with terms and concepts and has in a quite flexible way to
develop its conceptual apparatus from different sources, and from philosophy
among others.
Clearly problematical is the claim that neuroscience is good to explain
human behavior in pathological conditions and irrational behavior, but not
normal rational behavior. The question how to understand diseases without
knowing normal conditions is really difficult to understand and answer,
especially for people in medicine. Speaking about study consciousness, authors
have found philosophy and science to be complementary, but at same time they
cannot influence each other (403). So autonomous positions of philosophy and
science may easily start to work against their common progress as mentioned
above.
The central part of the book is the conceptual analysis of human mind
and its scientific research (Part II and III). Mind is taken here as the set of
traditionally recognized faculties which are very much originated and supported
by folk psychology and existing language. At first authors are disturbed of crypto-Cartesianism and ascription to brain properties and
abilities belonging to whole organism in modern neuroscientific
research (111). They also seem to declare that modern neuroscientists follow
old philosophical constructions which may block real progress of the science,
but surprisingly they conclude that crypto-Cartesianism
is not false but conceptually confusing and doesn’t make sense (112). I feel
this as a sign of softening in the position under pressure of neuroscientific reality and achievements, because there is
very difficult to find the neuroscientific enterprise
accepting this too holistic conceptual line. Authors’ theses on perceptions as
properties of objects and lack of representations about external world are
clearly provocative issues for contemporary neuroscientific
community and will hardly find real acceptance. Claims like “Sensations have
bodily locations and are felt by person, not by brain” (122), “The brain is
neither an organ of perception nor a
subject of perception. The neural events in the brain are not forms of
perceiving something in its vicinity. It is the animal that perceives and
manifests its perceiving something in its vicinity” (127) are badly
understandable by scientists on the reason that scientific common sense hold
the idea of functional specialization of biological structure..
The section of consciousness starts with short overview on current study
of consciousness from both scientific and philosophical perspectives and in
some places they seem to give advices to philosophy and neuroscience to limit itself
within their own area of interest (292). Such limitations are badly acceptable
both by modern science and philosophy, they both like and prefer more free area
for activity and the method is the key issue which limits their borders. The
study of consciousness is based on division of it to intransitive and
transitive forms, which is initiated obviously by importance but not totality
of the intentionality of consciousness. In this point authors and
neuroscientists are very much agree with each other, because scientists
(especially in medicine) use often the separation of consciousness as a state
and content of consciousness. In general it is obvious that conceptual clarity
is an important condition for future progress of consciousness studies, but main
question here is the source of the conceptual clarity and this moment empirical
support seems to be very much useful for that.
Authors repeat several times the task of philosophy is to provide
conceptual constructions which make sense. Scientists certainly follow the same
task, but they have different apparatus and conceptual space to do this, for
example design of experimental work may well serve as the issue for making
sense in neuroscience. The task to produce meaningful conceptual constructions
is clearly valuable and important for every cognitive activity, but science at
times takes rather more important to describe, predict, and reproduce reality
and at the same time science limits itself much more as philosophy does with
accordance between theoretical and empirical. In fact this limitation gives to
science freedom to change conceptual grounds and contents when new ones serve
better the explanations.
The dialogue would be a productive way of existence of science and
philosophy, but authors don’t seem to worry themselves too much whether real
neuroscience and its possible philosophical foundations can fit into one
theoretical scheme. Despite of its critical attitude the volume gives a good platform for mutual
discussions to create unified study of mind and to develop strong sides both
more theoretical and conceptual understanding in philosophy and empirical performance
of neuroscience.