Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Anderson, Dr. Michael L. (2005) Cognitive science and epistemic openness. [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press)

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Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism.

Item Type:Journal (Paginated)
Keywords:knowledge, vision, action, proprioception, realism
Subjects:Biology > Animal Cognition
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:3946
Deposited By: Anderson, Dr. Michael
Deposited On:20 Nov 2004
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:55

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