A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

Franceschi, Paul (2005) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]


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In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.

Item Type:Preprint
Keywords:Doomsday argument, two-urn case, emerald case, thought experiement, probability theory
Subjects:Philosophy > Logic
Philosophy > Epistemology
ID Code:4519
Deposited By: Franceschi, Paul
Deposited On:24 Aug 2005
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

References in Article

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Bostrom, N. (1997) ‘Investigations into the Doomsday argument’, preprint at

Bostrom, N. (2002) Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, New York, Routledge

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Franceschi, P. (2002) Une application des n-univers à l'argument de l'Apocalypse et au paradoxe de Goodman, Corté: University of Corsica, doctoral dissertation, published at Manuscrit-Université, Paris, 2004

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