Zombies in Searle's Chinese Room: Putting the Turing Test to Bed

Cutrona, Jr., Dr. Louis J. (2005) Zombies in Searle's Chinese Room: Putting the Turing Test to Bed. [Departmental Technical Report] (Unpublished)

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Searle’s discussions over the years 1980-2004 of the implications of his “Chinese Room” Gedanken experiment are frustrating because they proceed from a correct assertion: (1) “Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality;” and an incorrect assertion: (2) “The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program.” In this article, I describe how to construct a Gedanken zombie Chinese Room program that will pass the Turing test and at the same time unambiguously demonstrates the correctness of (1). I then describe how to construct a Gedanken Chinese brain program that will pass the Turing test, has a mind, and understands Chinese, thus demonstrating that (2) is incorrect. Searle’s instantiation of this program can and does produce intentionality. Searle’s longstanding ignorance of Chinese is simply irrelevant and always has been. I propose a truce and a plan for further exploration.

Item Type:Departmental Technical Report
Keywords:Chinese Room, computation, consciousness, intentionality, mind, programming, solipsism, Turing test, zombie
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
ID Code:4636
Deposited By: Cutrona Jr., Dr. Louis J.
Deposited On:05 Dec 2005
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

References in Article

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