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HOW TO SEPARATE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FROM EMPIRICAL ONES IN THE STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Velmans, Prof Max (2007) HOW TO SEPARATE CONCEPTUAL ISSUES FROM EMPIRICAL ONES IN THE STUDY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. [Book Chapter] (In Press)

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Abstract

Modern consciousness studies are in a healthy state, with many progressive empirical programmes in cognitive science, neuroscience and related sciences, using relatively conventional third-person research methods. However not all the problems of consciousness can be resolved in this way. These problems may be grouped into problems that require empirical advance, those that require theoretical advance, and those that require a re-examination of some of our pre-theoretical assumptions. I give examples of these, and focus on two problems—what consciousness is, and what consciousness does—that require all three. In this, careful attention to conscious phenomenology and finding an appropriate way to relate first-person evidence to third-person evidence appears to be central to progress. But we may also need to re-examine what we take to be “natural facts” about the world, and how we can know them. The same appears to be true for a trans-cultural understanding of consciousness that combines classical Indian phenomenological methods with the third-person methods of Western science.

Item Type:Book Chapter
Keywords:consciousness, mind, brain, cognitive science, neuroscience, hard problem, easy problem, first-person, third-person, phenomenology, Indian philosophy, dualism, materialism, reductionism, reflexive monism, causation, causal problem, natural fact
Subjects:Neuroscience > Neuropsychology
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
ID Code:5380
Deposited By: Velmans, Professor Max,
Deposited On:31 Jan 2007
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:56

References in Article

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Velmans, M. and Schneider, S (eds.) (2006) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.

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