A proof in Mind-Machine Equivalence

Farzad Didehvar

Department of computer science and Mathematics, Amirkabir University Of Technology, P.O Box 15875-44-13, Tehran, Iran
didehvar@cic.aut.ac.ir

Mohammad Saleh Zarepour

Department of Mathematical sciences, Sharif University of Technology, P.O Box 11365-9415, Tehran, Iran
ms_zarepour@yahoo.com

This is about the proof which is demonstrated in the article

*Epistemological Observations about Mind-Machine Equivalence*

which is written by the authors.

We want to demonstrate here; no one could prove in a certain way that he is a machine.

In brief the argument says:
Suppose I believe that "I am a machine", and my name is "X". The above means if some one asks me "are you a machine?" or more exactly "Is X a machine?" I will answer him "yes". Just now we consider this belief as a plausible one, and we show how it will lead us to this fact that its negation is plausible also. To put forward our argument, we can easily design a machine which if it faces the same question ("Is X a machine?") it replies back "NO". We can consider this machine in such a way that its function would be simply as following: when we supply it by the question "Is X a machine?" as input the out put would be "NO", and by supplying the other inputs our machine halts with no output. Now the question is: Between X and Y which of them are right? To answer this question, we should have a faire position to judge, the problem is: "The referee himself, is one of the competitors." So, any measurement of judgment and the standards of fairness are based on his opinion and it will not be faire, since "Y" has not the same opinion. In fact we define Y so simple, such that it couldn't have any opinion about these measurements, unless the measurement declares X is not a machine, which couldn't be declared by "X". Therefore there is no faire position, and no way to prove the declarations of whom(X or Y) is more plausible. In other word, for me(X), to be machine is as plausible as not to be a machine, so I can’t be sure that I am a machine. After all above, we conclude that either the belief of X is not plausible, or it is as plausible as its negation.

As conclusion, our main claim is

(**)  "I never could be certain that I am a machine".
Behind the above argument there are some presupposes. The First is called by *principal. Base on this principal, we say that the plausibility of assertions between X and Y are comparable. If you don't accept this point, and thinking that they are not comparable, in consequence, there will be no reason to prefer one of the assertions to the other. Again the X assertion is as plausible as Y so we couldn't prefer one and reject the other. So we have used in our argument *principal, but the conclusion finally is independent of accepting this principal or rejecting that, our main claim will be held. In words *principal is

*Let A and B be two machines, A and B are comparable respect to the amount of cognition and reasonability and justifiability of them.*

The second principal, whom we mention here, on the contrary to the first, is essential to be held: "For any judgment between two matters, we need a faire position between them". We think the only way to escape from the above argument and (**), is to tackle somehow this presuppose. By doing that we fall in some selfish type of thinking, which we know our idea and our thinking is sufficient to find the truth and we need no comparison to the other ideas. It means I know myself as an absolute measure and there is no need to compare myself to the others. Personally, we are against this point of view. The reason is, the way that the infrastructure of our knowledge has been formed. We didn't make that alone, we did it in society and by comparing and borrowing the other ideas. So by accepting this new point of view, we should recast whole structure of our knowledge, but it seems, even if we succeed to do that, what will be done would be very weak. In fact it will be very similar to the structure of knowledge of a person which is born in an isolated island and he rest there all of his life. It is doubtful such a person achieves any language unless it will be very naive. Intuitively, it is near to impossible, this person could ask himself a question like: Is he, himself a machine or not? In the end, as conclusion, anyone has two logical ways respect to the problem of equivalence, either accepting the above exaggerated solipsistic idea, or he never could be certain that he is a machine. Due to the above considerations, we suppose that, only the second case seems to be a reasonable one.