In 1986 Nadean Cool, a nurse's aide in Wisconsin sought therapy from a psychiatrist to help her cope with her reaction to a traumatic event experienced by her daughter. During therapy, the psychiatrist used hypnosis and other suggestive techniques to dig out buried memories of abuse that Cool herself had allegedly experienced. In the process Cool became convinced that she had repressed memories of having been in a satanic cult, eating babies, of being raped, of having sex with animals, and of being forced to watch the murder of her eight-year- old friend. She came to believe that she had over 120 personalities -- children, adults, angels and even a duck-all because, Cool was told, she had experienced severe childhood sexual and physical abuse. The psychiatrist also performed exorcisms on her, one of which lasted for five-hours and included the sprinkling of holy water and screams for Satan to leave Cool's body.
When Cool finally realized that false memories had been planted, she sued the psychiatrist for malpractice. In March 1997, after five weeks of trial, her case was settled out of court for $2.4 million dollars.
Nadean Cool is not the only patient to develop false memories as a result of questionable therapy. In Missouri, a church counselor helped Beth Rutherford to remember during therapy that her father, a clergyman, had regularly raped her between the ages of seven and l4 and that her mother sometimes helped him by holding her down. Under her therapist's guidance, Rutherford developed memories of her father twice impregnating her and forcing her to abort the fetus herself with a coat hanger. The father had to resign from his post as a clergyman when the allegations were made public. Later medical examination of their daughter revealed, however, that she was still a virgin at age 22 and had never been pregnant. The daughter sued the therapist and received a $l million settlement in 1996.
About a year earlier two juries returned verdicts against a Minnesota psychiatrist accused of planting false memories by former patients, Vynnette Hammane and Elizabeth Carlson, who, under hypnosis and sodium amytal, and after being fed misinformation about the workings of memory, had come to remember horrific abuse by family members. The juries awarded Hammane $2.67 million and Carlson $2.5 million for their ordeals.
In all four cases, the women developed memories about childhood abuse in therapy and then later denied their authenticity. How can we determine if memories of childhood abuse are true or false? Without corroboration, it is very difficult to differentiate between false memories and true ones. Also, in these cases, some memories are contrary to physical evidence, such as explicit and detailed memories of rape and abortion when medical examination confirmed virginity. How is it possible for people to acquire elaborate and confident false memories? A growing number of investigations demonstrate that under the right circumstances false memories can be instilled rather easily in some people.
My own research into memory distortion goes back to the early l970s when I began studies of the "misinformation effect." These studies show that when people who witness an event are later exposed to new and misleading information about it, their recollections often become distorted. In one example, participants viewed a simulated automobile accident at an intersection with a stop sign. After the viewing, half the participants received a suggestion that the traffic sign was a yield sign. When asked later what traffic sign they remembered seeing at the intersection, those who had been given the suggestion tended to claim that they had seen a yield sign. Those who had not received the phony information were much more accurate in their recall of the traffic sign.
My students and I have now conducted more than 200 experiments involving over 20,000 individuals that document how exposure to misinformation induces memory distortion. In these studies people "recalled" aconspicuous barn in a bucolic scene that contained no buildings at all, broken glass and tape recorders that were not in the scenes they viewed, a white instead of the blue vehicle in a crime scene, and Minnie Mouse when they actually saw Mickey Mouse. Taken together, these studies show that misinformation can change an individual's recollection in predictable and sometimes very powerful ways.
Misinformation has the potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people, when we are interrogated in a suggestive fashion, or when we read or view media coverage about some event that we may have experienced ourselves. After more than two decades exploring the power of misinformation, researchers have learned a great deal about the conditions that make people susceptible to memory modification. Memories are more easily modified, for instance, when the passage of time allows the original memory to fade.
My research associate, Jacqueline E. Pickrell, and I settled on trying to plant a specific memory of being lost in a shopping mall or large department store at about the age of five. Here's how we did it. We asked our subjects, 24 individuals ranging in age from 18 to 53, to try to remember childhood events that had been recounted by their parents, older sibling or other close relative. We prepared a booklet for each participant containing one-paragraph stories about three events that actually happened to him or her, and one that had not. We constructed the false event using information about a plausible shopping trip provided by a relative, who also verified that the participant had not actually been lost at about the age of five. The lost-in-the-mall scenario included the following elements: lost for an extended period of time, crying, aid and comfort by an elderly woman and, finally, reunion with the family.
After reading each story in the booklet, the participants wrote what they remembered about the event. If they did not remember it, they were told to write, "I do not remember this." In two follow-up interviews, we told the participants that we were interested in examining how much detail they could remember, and how their memories compared with those of their relative. The event paragraphs were not read to them verbatim, but rather portions were provided as retrieval cues. The participants remembered something about 49 of the 72 true events (68 percent) immediately after the initial reading of the booklet and also in each of the two follow up interviews. After reading the booklet, seven of the 24 participants (29 percent) remembered either partially or fully the false event constructed for them, and in the two follow-up interviews six participants (25 percent) continued to claim that they remembered the fictitious event. Statistically, there were some differences between the true memories and the false ones: participants used more words to describe the true memories, and they rated the true memories as being somewhat more clear. But if an on-looker were to observe many of our participants describe an event, it would be difficult indeed to tell whether the account was of a true or a false memory.
Of course, being lost, however frightening, is not the same as being abused. But the lost-in-the-mall study is not about real experiences of being lost; it is about planting false memories of being lost. The paradigm shows a way of instilling false memories, and takes a step toward allowing us to understand how this might happen in real world settings. Moreover, the study provides evidence that people can be led to remember their past in different ways, and they can even be coaxed into too "remembering" entire events that never happened.
Studies in other laboratories using a similar experimental procedure have produced similar results. For instance, Ira Hyman, Troy H. Husband and F. James Billings of Western Washington University asked college students to recall childhood experiences that had been recounted by their parents. The researchers told the students that the study was about how people remember shared experiences differently. In addition to actual events reported by parents, each participant was given one false event -- either an overnight hospitalization for a high fever and a possible ear infection, or a birthday party with pizza and a clown -- that supposedly happened at about the age of five. The parents confirmed that neither of these events actually took place.
Hyman found that students fully or partially recalled 84 percent of the true events in the first interview and 88 percent in the second interview. None of the participants recalled the false event during the first interview, but 20 percent said they remembered something about the false event in the second interview. One participant who had been exposed to the emergency hospitalization event later remembered a male doctor, a female nurse and a friend from church who came to visit at the hospital.
In another study, along with true events Hyman presented different false events, such as accidentally spilling a bowl of punch on the parents of the bride at a wedding reception or having to evacuate a grocery store when the overhead sprinkler systems erroneously activate. Again, none of the participants recalled the false event during the first interview, but 18 percent remembered something about it in the second interview and 25 percent in the third interview. For example, during the first interview one participant, when asked about the fictitious wedding event, stated, "I have no clue. I have never heard that one before." In the second interview the participant said: "It was an outdoor wedding and I think we were running around and knocked something over like the punch bowl or something and um made a big mess and of course got yelled at for it."
Surveys of clinical psychologists reveal that 11 percent instruct their clients to "let the imagination run wild" and 22 percent tell their clients to "give free rein to the imagination." Therapist Wendy Maltz, author of a popular book on childhood sexual abuse, advocates telling the patient: "Spend time imagining that you were sexually abused, without worrying about accuracy, proving anything, or having your ideas make sense. . . . Ask yourself. . .these questions: What time of day is it? Where are you? Indoors or outdoors? What kind of things are happening? Is there one or more person with you?" Maltz further recommends that therapists continue to ask questions such as: "Who would have been likely perpetrators? When were you most vulnerable to sexual abuse in your life?"
The increasing use of such imagination exercises led me and several colleagues to wonder about their consequences. What happens when people imagine childhood events that did not happen to them? Does imagining a childhood event increase confidence that it occurred? To explore this, we designed a three-stage procedure. We first asked individuals to indicate the likelihood that certain events happened to them during their childhood. The list contains 40 events, each rated on a scale ranging from "definitely did not happen" to "definitely did happen." Two weeks later, we asked the participants to imagine that they had experienced some of these events. Different subjects were asked to imagine different events. Some time later the participants again were asked to respond to the original list of 40 childhood events, indicating how likely it was that these events actually happened to them.
Consider one of the imagination exercises. The participants are told to imagine playing inside at home after school, hearing a strange noise outside, running toward the window, tripping, falling, reaching out and breaking the window with their hand. In addition, we asked participants questions such as: "What did you trip on?" "How did you feel?"
In one study, 24 percent of the participants who imagined the broken-window scenario later reported an increase in confidence that the event had occurred, whereas only 12 percent of those who were not asked to imagine the event reported an increase in the likelihood that the event had taken place. We found this "imagination inflation" effect in each of the eight events that participants were asked to imagine. A number of possible explanations come to mind. An obvious one is that an act of imagination simply makes the event seem more familiar and that familiarity is mistakenly related to childhood memories rather than to the act of imagination. Such source confusion -- when a person does not remember the source of information -- can be especially acute for the distant events of childhood.
Studies of by Lyn Goff and Henry L. Roediger III of Washington University of recent rather than childhood experiences more directly connect imagined actions to the construction of false memory. During the initial session, the researchers instructed participants to perform the stated action, imagine doing it, or just listen to the statement but do nothing else. The actions were simple ones such as knock on the table, lift the stapler, break the toothpick, cross your fingers, roll your eyes. During a second session, the participants were asked to imagine some of the actions that they had not previously performed. During the final session, they answered questions about what actions they actually performed during the initial session. The investigators found that the more times participants imagined an unperformed action, the more likely they were to remember having performed it.
Spanos and his co-workers found that the vast majority of their subjects were susceptible to these memory-planting procedures. Both the hypnotic and guided participants reported infant memories. Surprisingly, the guided group did so somewhat more (95 versus 70 percent). Both groups remembered the colored mobile at a relatively high rate (56 percent of the guided group and 46 percent of the hypnotic subjects). Many participants who did not remember the mobile did recall other things, such as doctors, nurses, bright lights, cribs and masks. Also, in both groups, of those who reported memories of infancy, 49 percent felt that they were real memories, as opposed to 16 percent who claimed that they were merely fantasies. These findings confirm earlier studies that many individuals can be led to construct complex, vivid and detailed false memories via a rather simple procedure. Hypnosis clearly is not necessary.
This was shown in a study by Saul M. Kassin and his colleagues at Williams College, who investigated the reactions of individuals falsely accused of damaging a computer by pressing the wrong key. The innocent participants initially denied the charge, but when a confederate said that she had seen them perform the action, many participants signed a confession, internalized guilt for the act and went on to confabulate details that were consistent with that belief. These findings show that false incriminating evidence can induce people to accept guilt for a crime they did not commit, and even to develop memories to support their guilty feelings.
Research studies are beginning to give us an understanding of how false memories of complete, emotional and self-participatory experiences are created in adults. First, there are social demands on individuals to remember; for instance, researchers exert some pressure on participants in a study to come up with memories. Second, memory construction by imagining events can be explicitly encouraged when people are having trouble remembering. And, finally, individuals can be encouraged not to think about whether their constructions are real or not. Creation of false memories are most likely to occur when these external factors are present, whether this occurs in an experimental setting, in a therapeutic setting, or in everyday activities.
False memories are constructed by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions received from others. During the process, individuals may forget the source of the information. This is a classic example of source confusion, in which the content and the source become dissociated.
Of course, simply because we can implant false childhood memories in some individuals in no way implies that all memories that arise after suggestion are necessarily false. Put another way, although experimental work on false memory creation may raise doubt about the validity of long-buried memories, such as repeated trauma, it in no way disproves them. Without corroboration, there is little that can be done to help even the most experienced evaluator to differentiate true memories from ones that are suggestively planted.
The precise mechanisms by which such false memories are constructed await further research. We still have much to learn about the degree of confidence and the characteristics of false memories created in these ways, and we need to discover what types of individuals are particularly susceptible to these forms of suggestion and, conversely, who is resistant.
As we continue this work, it is important to heed the cautionary tale in the data we have already obtained: mental health professionals and others must be aware of how much they can influence the recall of events and of the great need for maintaining restraint in situations in which imagination is used as an aid in recovering presumably lost memories.
The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, internalization, and confabulation, Saul M. Kassin and Katherine L. Kiechel in Psychological Science, Vol. 7, No. 3, pagees 125-128; May, 1996.
Imagination Inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. Maryanne Garry, Charles G. Manning, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Steven J. Sherman in Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, vol. 3, No. 2, pages 208-214; June 1996.
Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory. Edited by David C. Rubin. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. Daniel L. Schacter. BasicBooks, 1996.