Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data?

Stieg, Chuck (2004) Mental Representations: the New Sense-Data? (Unpublished)

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The notion of representation has become ubiquitous throughout cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience and the cognitive sciences generally. This paper addresses the status of mental representations as entities that have been posited to explain cognition. I do so by examining similarities between mental representations and sense-data in both their characteristics and key arguments offered for each. I hope to show that more caution in the adoption and use of representations in explaining cognition is warranted. Moreover, by paying attention to problematic notions of representations, a less problematic sense of representation might emerge.

Item Type:Other
Keywords:Mental Representation, Sense Data
Subjects:Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
Philosophy > Epistemology
Philosophy > Metaphysics
Psychology > Cognitive Psychology
ID Code:6174
Deposited By: Stieg, Chuck
Deposited On:24 Aug 2008 10:56
Last Modified:11 Mar 2011 08:57

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