Harnad, Stevan (2009) First Person Singular. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Brian Rotman argues that (one) 'mind' and (one) 'god' are only conceivable, literally, because of (alphabetic) literacy, which allowed us to designate each of these ghosts as an incorporeal, speaker-independent 'I' (or, in the case of infinity, a notional agent that goes on counting forever). I argue that to have a mind is to have the capacity to feel. No one can be sure which organisms feel, hence have minds, but it seems likely that one-celled organisms and plants do not, whereas animals do. So minds originated before humans and before language --hence, a fortiori, before writing, whether alphabetic or ideographic.
Item Type: | Preprint |
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Additional Information: | Review of: Brian Rotman: Becoming Beside Ourselves: Alphabet, ghosts, distributed human beings |
Keywords: | language, evolution, consciousness, writing, mind, multimedia |
Subjects: | Psychology > Cognitive Psychology |
ID Code: | 6418 |
Deposited By: | Harnad, Stevan |
Deposited On: | 12 Apr 2009 22:41 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:57 |
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