Martínez, Manolo (2010) Imperative Content and the Painfulness of Pain. [Journal (Paginated)] (In Press)
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Abstract
Abstract Representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness have problems in accounting for pain, for at least two reasons. First of all, the negative affective phenomenology of pain (its painfulness) does not seem to be representational at all. Secondly, pain experiences are not transparent to introspection in the way perceptions are. This is reflected, e. g., in the fact that we do not acknowledge pain hallucinations. In this paper I defend that representationalism has the potential to overcome these objections. Defenders of representationalism have tried to analyse every kind of phenomenal character in terms of indicative contents. But there is another possibility: affective phenomenology, in fact, depends on imperative representational content. This provides a satisfactory solution to the aforementioned difficulties.
Item Type: | Journal (Paginated) |
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Subjects: | Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind |
ID Code: | 6899 |
Deposited By: | Martínez, Manolo |
Deposited On: | 29 Jul 2010 01:43 |
Last Modified: | 11 Mar 2011 08:57 |
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