A modern nihilism
Marc
Krellenstein,
June, 2005 -
December, 2009
Abstract
Presents
the author's evolving views of the best current positions on certain core
philosophical and psychological problems. These positions together suggest a
skeptical or nihilist perspective modified by evolutionary psychology and
contemporary philosophy that embraces our desire to live as best we can and the
relative and psychological reality of values, free will and other phenomena
while recognizing limitations on their foundations and our understanding. The
below makes no claims to originality for most of the ideas expressed, drawing
on a range of mostly unreferenced texts that will be familiar to philosophers
and psychologists working in this area.
(June,
2005)
1.
The origin of the universe cannot be understood.
We
can see no reason why the universe exists, and it doesn't seem we could ever
find one. Any explanation would become part of what has to be explained. This
is the familiar but no less profound possibility of always asking
"why?": any explanation becomes part of what is to be explained. Given
the way our minds are constructed, no final satisfactory explanation seems
possible. Even a newly discovered law of physics would pose the question as to
why that should be the case -- why anything should exist at all or ever come
into existence (see, for example, Nozick, 1981, or Krellenstein, 1995).
1.1
The Big Bang is not a complete explanation for the origin of the universe.
The
Big Bang may explain the origin of the universe but it only provides an
explanation up to a certain point in time...or perhaps to the beginning of time
itself. It does not explain why there should be space-time or laws of physics
that might allow a Big Bang and a universe to emerge from nothing at all. Some
object that the question of an explanation or prior cause for the Big Bang is
meaningless -- how could there be a cause prior in time when there isn't even
time itself? In that case the creation of the universe from nothing, or an
equally mysterious infinite sequence of a universe being born and dying (or an
infinity of universes), is itself the final answer. But if it is the answer it
is one that seems incomplete or literally incomprehensible. Wittgenstein said:
"It is not how things are in the world that is mystical but that it
exists" (1961, p. 149).
1.2
An incomprehensible explanation for the universe is possible.
It's
possible that a final explanation for the origin of the universe exists but
cannot be known by us. Such an explanation, even if incomprehensible, seems
more likely and more desirable than a universe that came into being from simply
nothing. Perhaps this is because the explanation at least satisfies the
deep-seated belief that everything has an explanation. The existence of this
incomprehensible explanation might be confirmed by meeting an alien species
that convinces us there is more to the brute existence of the universe than we
ourselves can comprehend. Or maybe our minds will someday evolve (or just be
sufficiently educated/modified?) to the point where other forms of satisfactory
explanation are possible. Perhaps those who are already satisfied that the
ultimate origin of the universe is a meaningless or a fully answered question
already have such minds.
1.3
A theory of the universe that compels its own existence is unlikely.
It's
been suggested that an explanation or theory for the origin of the universe
could be found that compels it own existence and leaves no further question.
But we have no idea what such a theory might look like and no reason to think
such a theory is possible.
2.
Morality has no absolute rational foundation.
There
is no successful chain of reasoning that has been offered as to why we must
adopt any fundamental moral obligation or value over another, or any at
all...the very concept of an objective moral truth that commands obedience is,
to use Mackie's term, 'queer' (1977). That people often do or seem to act this
way is clear, as it is that many values and behaviors are shared and others are
not. But there is no knock-down argument we can offer someone who believes
deeply in a fundamental value we do not share, or in its greater importance
than another value (cf. some arguments over abortion that set the sanctity of
any form of unique human life against the right of control over one's own
body). The variation in moral beliefs across people/cultures and time (despite
attempts to rationalize such differences) argues against the possibility that,
despite their queerness, there simply do exist common moral obligations (this
is Mackie's 'argument from relativity'). (It might be argued that the belief
that there are no absolute foundations is itself an absolute foundational
belief. It may be foundational but, rather than absolute, it is an observation
that no rational argument has established such values, and it leaves open at
least the possibility that an argument could be offered that proves otherwise.)
2.1
Moral agreement and disagreement are ultimately arbitrary.
We
may judge another's behavior morally wrong to indicate its inconsistency with
our deepest feelings and principles about how people should treat each other,
principles (if principles are articulated rather than only feelings/behavior
expressed) such as respect for an individual's rights, maximizing the greatest
good, acceptance of a social contract, a particular sense of justice, the word
of God or whatever we believe comprises and justifies that belief (some will
also count as within the purview of morality behaviors aimed only or primarily
at ourselves, such as suicide or drug use). Moral obligations are also
experienced as commands (if not always absolute commands) that apply equally to
everyone. But any underlying emotion or principle we assert to another as
primary is arbitrary in the absence of agreement over its overriding value. We
may claim that certain values are built in through evolution, are consistent
with our survival as individuals or a species or tend to maximize pleasure or
happiness of the individual or group. But none of those justify particular
values without agreement on the underlying value of what is innate or
productive of survival or pleasure, and agreement on values does not by itself
imply obligations (vs. desirability) regarding them. This does not prevent us
from reasoning with those with whom we share at least some values (or perceived
obligations) to show that a behavior (or what results from it) is in fact
consistent or inconsistent with those shared values, and such arguments occupy
much of what counts as moral debate. Some disagreements can also be seen as
disagreements over the purported facts of the matter -- whether animals are
conscious, whether one group of people represents an inherent danger to others
-- or over predictions of what will result from a particular behavior, e.g.,
will allowing euthanasia start us down a slippery slope to allowing other forms
of taking a life. However, it is when the facts or likely outcomes are not in
dispute and discussion breaks down -- over abortion, competing religious and
political dogma, certain animal rights -- that we are faced with a conflict
between competing fundamental values (or with the denial of moral values
altogether) that debate alone cannot resolve. (Singer, 1993, recommends we
accept at least some moral point of view because it can give meaning to our
lives, something beyond ourselves. The quest for meaning seems clear, but it
seems questionable whether we can set out to give meaning to our life by
embracing morality if it does not already fill that role.)
2.2
The origin of morality probably lies in evolution.
It
seems likely that our moral sense -- the very existence and 'ought' of moral
judgments as well as many of the particular moral precepts that exist -- has
its origins in evolution. An innate sense of sympathy, tit-for-tat reciprocity
and other similar traits probably provided evolutionary advantages when they
first appeared, increasing the likelihood of the survival of the individual or
perhaps a group with such shared characteristics. Individual choice, culture
and, more generally, the sort of human brain given by evolution that allows for
our apparent ability to choose and the creation of cultures can then take such
morality far beyond what was given in evolution. As Nozick (2001) explains,
deeply rooted norms become efficient ways for biology and/or culture to
maintain the benefits of coordinated behavior...we don't need to reason through
every situation, and norms may reinforce overall beneficial behavior when
reasoning alone wouldn't get there (e.g., in 'Prisoner's Dilemma' situations
where individuals do better only if both cooperate rather than act in their
apparent self-interest).
2.3
There isn't one moral theory.
It's
no surprise that specific moral intuitions and developed practices built on
them have not yielded to a single principle of explanation (e.g., the greatest
good). There is little reason for evolution to have crafted us (to the extent
we are shaped by evolution) in a way that is simple, consistent or even clear
to rational examination (let alone productive of our greatest overall
happiness). Only net survival benefit counts for evolution. A behavior or
rationale that provides a survival benefit in one situation may not in another
situation, for which a different or even contrary behavior may be more
appropriate. Some behaviors may also be the accidental consequence of something
of great adaptive value, even if that by-product is itself not useful or even
counter-productive.
2.4
A complete moral realism is unlikely.
Could
it yet be possible that there are moral truths even if we cannot establish them
by reason alone? The existence of transcendent, objective moral truths that we
might somehow discover seems unlikely, though many or most believe in their
existence (Joyce, 2010 has suggested that most moral philosophers -- though not
most of all philosophers -- are probably believers, or they would have been
unlikely to pursue moral philosophy). A more practical moral realism might mean
that at least some principles exist which provide a path to a life which any
one would choose if informed and freely able to choose (or they would at least
be better off if they made such a choice). Such a morality might provide a key
less to external nature than to the internal nature of a person (or perhaps all
persons) -- to psychology. It seems at least possible that some prohibitions --
e.g., that it is wrong to murder innocents -- could fit this description given
how widely shared are both the prohibitions and the belief of the effect on the
individual of violating them; or, conversely, that some positive principles
really exist, given the broad and cross-cultural desirability of certain
character virtues such as courage. But prohibitions and principles it would be
irrational not to follow are still short of moral obligations one is commanded
to follow (though some feel otherwise). It also seems unlikely that there are
moral truths of any kind that apply to all behaviors considered morally
relevant given what we can see of the complex way psychological nature unfolds
through biology and environment and the range of opinion on and apparent effects
of various behaviors. Nietzsche for one thought authenticity and the exercise
of the will more important than compassion. More conventionally, the split
between conservative and liberal attitudes found in so many societies suggests
at least a bifurcated set of moral principles and possible root psychology.
2.5
Moral and philosophical disagreement is mostly psychological in origin.
Purely
philosophical discussion of morality cannot explain it, especially attempts to
reduce it to a single principle. The most technical philosophical discussions
often hinge on the intuitive acceptance or rejection of premises that simply
seem reasonable or not to someone. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2001) has
persuasively argued that morality is primarily driven by a range of intuitions
and emotions, though moral discourse plays a role in persuading others if not a
fundamental one in actually generating moral behavior. (This resonates both
with traditional philosophical intuitionism -- morality grounded on directly
perceived intuitions -- as well as with emotivism -- that morality is more a
matter of emotional approval/disapproval than specific principles. See Miller,
2003, for a discussion of recent philosophical attempts to ground morality.)
Similarly, Caputo (2000) has observed that ethical reasoning usually starts
with conclusions, not premises. A better way to understand a moral judgment (or
even the embrace of an entire moral philosophy) might be to look at the
individual's temperament, upbringing, historical context, etc. and, for an
entire philosophy, to recognize the tendencies to both over-generalize from
one's own perspective and to broaden judgments and theories to encompass
phenomena for which they may not be applicable. Ad hominem arguments don't refute facts or premises but can provide
useful insights as to why someone's core beliefs, intuitions and speculations
are what they are when there is little objective basis (or discernible
progress) in deciding between competing points of view. (The same can be said about
this author and the views expressed here. One can only be aware of some of the
pitfalls and be as careful as possible.)
3.
Some people have unquestioned beliefs they view as absolute
Some
have an unquestioned and, for them, unquestionable conviction in the origin or
purpose of the universe or in the way people must be treated, a conviction
beyond reason that others cannot be persuaded of. We might broadly label all
such convictions as religious. For such people tolerance of other views may not
be acceptable or make sense.
3.1
Unquestioned beliefs may benefit those who believe them.
It
could be argued that an unquestioned belief in the origin of the universe or
the foundation of morality is a benefit to those who have it. Maybe such
individuals possess a certain biological disposition to religious belief that
is itself the result of evolution, e.g., people susceptible to such beliefs
might be more inclined to sacrifice themselves in situations where it furthers
the survival of those same genes in offspring and related group members. There
is some evidence that religious belief is correlated with longer life
expectancy. Similarly, there is evidence that people fare better with an
optimistic or exaggerated, rather than realistic, sense of their own abilities
or importance. In all these cases beliefs congruent with a rational examination
of reality do not serve the individual as well as other beliefs (or an absence
of beliefs, if 'ignorance is bliss'). This is not so surprising from an
evolutionary viewpoint. Knowledge and realistic beliefs presumably provide
certain evolutionary benefits, but perhaps not all the time and in all
situations.
3.2
Choosing to acquire an unquestioned belief is problematic.
If
there are benefits to unquestioned beliefs about the universe or morality
should we then attempt to become such believers -- or optimists, or selectively
ignorant -- if we are not? Perhaps, if people are able to and so inclined. For
many, setting out to believe in something without question is not attractive,
and probably difficult to achieve, even if it can happen more or less
unintended. It is also hard and unappealing to go back to a state in which one
is ignorant of a problem or of the adequacy of a supposed solution. We might
recognize such a state as providing greater happiness after it is attained but
still reject it because choosing it is inconsistent with what currently makes
us happy, such as valuing what we consider to be more (rather than less) knowledge
of the world as it really is, or valuing the autonomy that such a state would
seem to reduce.
3.3
Experience machines, drugs and psychotherapy.
Nozick
(1974) says why we might not choose to hook ourselves up to 'experience
machines' that could deliver any kind of reality we chose (e.g., the experience
of writing a great novel) because we value our experience being real in
addition to the experiences themselves. Something like this is probably part of
some people's uneasiness about certain forms of psychopharmacology.
Psychotherapy seems preferable for many because they think it effects its
improvements by 'really' transforming us -- our beliefs, behaviors and emotions
-- rather than by giving us a drug-induced experience. But it's not clear from
the evidence that psychotherapy always works this way, or that some drugs may
not be as transformational (Kramer, 1993; some people report that the
prescribed drugs allowed them to be their 'real selves'). There remain knotty
problems here, though, in the end, drugs are not all that different from
psychotherapy or any other form of personality manipulation (including
religious conversion), all of which, if successful, ultimately result in
changes in the brain that produce the desired effects with greater or less
difficulty, with fewer or more undesirable side-effects and with varying
degrees of permanence and related changes (and the ability to deliberately
reverse them). (Medication or therapy might also produce effects that we didn't
explicitly want but with which we are happy, or at least newly tolerant. These
might include effects that we not only didn't choose but would have avoided if
we knew they would occur. Kramer reports that few patients he's aware of
discontinue SSRI-type anti-depressants despite experiencing the not so uncommon
sexual side-effect of delayed, or the inability to attain, orgasm, suggesting
it's because patients so value the benefits of the medication. Reduced libido
has also been reported with such drugs. However, it may be that some patients
do not simply tolerate these unwanted side-effects but no longer experience
them as undesirable in the same way. This fits with Kramer's idea that the
drugs effect a broader transformation than simply addressing symptoms.)
3.4
Do unquestioned beliefs imply anything about their truth?
Does
the conviction of people with deeply held religious or moral beliefs imply
anything about the truth of those beliefs? To the extent that education tends
to offset the inclinations of true believers, or that there is a correlation
between non-belief and education or intelligence -- both of which appear to be
true -- such conviction does not provide strong support for the reality of
beliefs that cannot be demonstrated but only seen as self-evident by those who
so perceive them. Of course, humans are as fundamentally irrational as they are
sometimes rational.
4.
We don't really have free will but can act as if we do
The
so-called compatabilist position embraced by some philosophers seems hard to
refute: namely, that we seem to have free will (it is the only world we know),
and might as well act as if we do (and treat people as responsible for their
actions), but no, not really -- everything is physically determined. The only
exception to complete physical determinism arises from quantum uncertainties --
the probabilistic nature of behavior at the level of elementary particles. In
principle this uncertainty continues all the way up to our macro reality, but
is so rare at that level as to be safely ignored. Some have argued that these
quantum uncertainties are nonetheless what give us freely chosen human
behavior, but the arguments for this are so far unconvincing. Still, the puzzle
of how conscious observation of a physical state resolves these quantum
uncertainties remains.
5.
Brains are conscious but we don't know how.
Consciousness
is a puzzle. It seems the brain alone gives rise to consciousness -- there is
no good evidence for a soul or for irreducible pieces of consciousness making
us self-aware -- but we don't understand how the brain does it and probably
never will, as least as it applies to our experience of qualia, the particular
sensations of sound, color, pain, etc. No matter how much brain function we can
imagine understanding, and no matter how tightly correlated that function is
shown to be with the minutiae of these experiences, there appears to be an
irreducible 'explanatory gap' between the most we can ever say about neurons or
electrical fields in the brain and the tangible experience of reality. How does
anything we can learn or theorize about the brain explain the particularities
of the raw sensations we feel? Suggestions that certain physical or structural
states are simply identical with these experiences and explain them as
completely as they can be explained are as unsatisfactory and seem as
incomplete as claims that the universe originated from nothing and there is no
more to be said about the matter. (This 'mysterian' position regarding
consciousness was first discussed at length in McGinn, 1989. See also
Krellenstein, 1995.)
5.1
We're unlikely to be able to explain consciousness.
As
with the origin of the universe, it's conceivable to imagine the discovery of
concepts so different from those we now possess that a solution to the problem
of explaining qualia will somehow be possible. But we have no reason to believe
it for this problem either. It's true that other past scientific problems --
what makes something alive, for example -- seemed unsolvable but were later
solved. But no such scientific problem (other than, indeed, the problem of the
ultimate origin of the universe) seems (or seemed) to have quite the conceptual
difficulties of the consciousness problem.
5.2
Machines can be conscious but we don't know how.
If
the brain alone produces consciousness then it seems possible that an
artificial machine could be built that would be conscious. In this view we are
ourselves just such a machine. Based on what we understand about the brain as
an information processing engine it's reasonable to believe that a computer
with the rights sorts of inputs and outputs from and to the real world, and
possibly made of the right materials, could power the brain part of a conscious
machine. Arguments that a particular limitation of computers makes it impossible
for such a machine to be built can't always be conclusively refuted but are not
really relevant, since we can't see how the physiology of the brain could
produce consciousness and could produce similar arguments showing it to be
impossible, though in the case of the human brain we have the brute fact that
it happens. If it turns out we are never able to understand how that happens
for a brain then we may never be able to know how to construct such a conscious
machine (except, perhaps, as an indirect or accidental consequence of some
construction), but that will not make it any less possible in principle.
6.
We live by personal values, biological dispositions, upbringing, habit and
choice.
The
existentialist accepts nihilism but aims to counter it with acts of will and
choice, creating value where none exists to start. This may be a good strategy
for a nihilist to try to live by, though what will work for one may not for
another. More significantly, a modern nihilism forces us in the end to reject
the claim that the existentialist can necessarily create value in more than a
personal sense through acts of will...some may experience that, others
not...and these acts will not necessarily persuade others of the value of a
particular course of action. As a practical matter, we have deep-rooted
beliefs, or at least deeply felt emotions about what we want or believe is or
isn't acceptable even if we can't offer completely convincing explanations to
ourselves or others and don't view them as absolutes. Personal values -- the
values we have and adopt even if we can't consider them absolute -- play a
significant role in living the life we do. To the extent we examine our beliefs
(and we may not very much or at all) we may adopt a pragmatic viewpoint,
accepting certain things as quasi-foundational. We then reason (or more often
rationalize after the fact, if Haidt is correct) from such beliefs as we have
and towards such goals as we have and choose (to the extent we choose them). We
choose to be with others with similar values...or to express ourselves...or
value others...or maximize our sensual pleasures (or, more commonly, some
combination of these and others) and perhaps we choose some of these because,
for us, there really is no other choice...or some choices work better for us
even if we can't ground that choice in anything beyond dispute. Some things we
do because of temperament and/or because we were raised that way (learning
morality has been likened to learning a particular language: a natural
proclivity is elaborated with a certain set of rules, but the specifics can
vary...no one rule is absolutely right any more than one language is) -- and
choose to so raise others (or just fall into doing so) -- or there was another
reason we did them initially but they become habitual (and habits are extremely
useful time and effort savers). The psychology of 'functional autonomy'
suggests that whatever is habitual may become valued in its own right. We come
to accept, or not, the absence of clear foundations and the limitations in our
understanding.
7.
We don't know how much we can modify ourselves, what makes up happy or what we
value.
Human
nature has in part evolved and been encoded in biology, at least in the form of
underlying tendencies. Our culture also places limitations on us, or makes some
choices much harder or easier than others. There is an interesting list of
behaviors found in all cultures, e.g., sexual jealousy and modesty. However,
what is natural or culturally produced (and they are often at odds), even if
found among all people, still has no automatic claim to being of paramount
value, of making us happy or of being unchangeable. But just how changeable are
we?
7.1
There can be a cost in curtailing biologically based tendencies.
Frustrating
a biological tendency can result in (negatively experienced) frustration. This
frustration may be reduced or not experienced negatively if in exchange we
perceive a personal benefit, or a social benefit that returns an indirect
personal benefit (e.g., general prohibitions against violence). It may be
possible to further reduce or eliminate frustration if the tendency can be
modified through learning or habitual non-practice. Freud thought our
biological and primarily sexual 'instincts' could be transformed, and needed to
be for the sake of civilization, though he didn't think satisfaction of the
transformed ('sublimated') instincts could be as pleasurable as satisfaction of
the original. Few believe today that all our pleasures and activities derive
their psychic energy from sex or other basic instincts. But we sometimes
perceive connections or experience passionate pleasure from different
activities in a similar way, possibly indicating conflated origins and a common
neurophysiology.
(August,
2005)
7.2
Deliberate change
We
choose to develop interests or acquire tastes but have less control over our
personality or what is most important to us. Some changes may be forced on us,
or become a part of us through daily routine. We can work towards personal and
social transformation and deliberately build some changes in ourselves and
others over time, to some extent. Individual variability and external
reinforcement play a significant role in what's possible. Most people can learn
to control urges for revenge. Some choose celibacy without apparent cost (how
many?), while for many monogamy is difficult to sustain or not really embraced
in the first place, or exists for a period of time in a state of tension.
Pinker (1997) casts doubt on the 1960's ambitions of free love and an
egalitarian society, arguing persuasively for the widespread existence, likely
evolutionary origins and great difficulty in overcoming sexual jealousy and
competition. Modern day capitalism has lately run rampant over any alternative
economic model in its appeal to a view of human nature based on universal and
mostly unmodifiable self-interest and competition. But just how desirable (or
undesirable) and unchangeable are which tendencies?
(January,
2006)
7.3
The significance of sex differences
It's
known that the physiology and brains of men and women are different, and
there's little doubt that there are some differences between men's and women's
average characteristics and behaviors that are primarily the result of these
underlying biological differences. There are also differences due mostly to the
effects of culture, as well as presumed differences that empirical testing does
or might indicate are not really true differences at all. Such differences as
have been established are relatively small and of a usually unknown mix of
biological and cultural factors. These differences do not seem to determine or
limit the characteristics of a given individual, e.g., although men are
stronger than women on average (probably partly because of cultural differences
but also because men tend to be larger), any given woman may be as strong or
stronger than any given man. As a result, these average differences between the
sexes are of very limited use in determining what any given individual might or
might not be capable of, excel at or find pleasure in. And while
characteristics of mostly biological origin may sometimes be more difficult to
change, average differences of usually unknown (or even of known) origin don't
help much in determining just how hard or easy changing a particular
characteristic will be for a given individual. However, this does not mean that
understanding such differences is of no use at all. It's possible to consider
stereotypes as primarily empirical claims about the average characteristics of
a group. The negative connotation of stereotyping applies mostly to situations
where the claims are false or erroneously assumed to apply to all individuals
in the group and/or are used in place of (and sometimes despite even knowing)
the actual characteristics of the individual. It may also be a problem when
stereotyped differences are wrongly assumed to be unchangeable (which is more
often attributed to stereotypes believed to be biological in origin). But an
accurate stereotype may provide at least some information when more specific or
useful information is not available or possible. Forced to choose randomly from
a group of men or women for a task requiring great strength one would be better
off choosing from the group of men.
A
much harder question is to what extent a true stereotype -- of people in
general and in all cultures (i.e., a so-called fact or at least statistical
claim about mostly biologically determined human nature) or of men or women in
particular -- should be used in combination with other available information.
Even if the individual in question is oneself or someone else known first-hand
there is often insufficient information for making important judgments. If a
stereotype is valid and of sufficient magnitude it could be reasonable to
consider it as a clue or best guess about the existence or strength of an
uncertain characteristic or behavior, though giving it its proper due (and no
more) may be difficult. In reality there are few stereotypes of usefulness that
are certain or of clearly known strength compared to individual factors we may
know directly...the greater parenting drive or capability of women? the greater
promiscuity of men? And any such established statistical difference, can,
again, make no automatic claim to be being unchangeable (whether mostly
biological or cultural), productive of our happiness or of intrinsic value. But
it may sometimes be reasonable to assess the evidence for and strength of these
purported average differences and see what if any role they might play in the
decisions we make.
(October,
2006)
8.
Morality is real, but nihilism about its foundations can't be avoided
Steven
Pinker (2002) observes that an evolutionary basis for morality invites nihilism
(i.e., moral nihilism -- the view that there are no objective moral truths)
because of the nature of evolutionary adaptation, which happens by chance and
persists because of its survival value. Pinker thinks nihilism can be avoided
because moral behavior may have evolved in conformance with an objective
morality grounded in the logic and benefits of reciprocal, cooperative behavior
-- it's hard to argue someone has an obligation without being similarly
obliged, and we benefit overall from certain behaviors. Even if there isn't an
objective morality, Pinker argues that our moral sense is 'real for us' and
can't simply be dismissed. But the logic of reciprocal obligation only applies
if we already accept someone having an obligation to do something rather than
just finding it desirable; not wanting you to hurt me doesn't imply you have an
obligation not to hurt me (see Harman in Harman & Thomson, 1996) or what
might be the resulting obligation for me not to hurt you. The net benefits of
cooperation also do not imply obligations; a given individual (or nation state)
at a particular time may well be better served by acting selfishly. While
morality is still 'real for us,' this too falls short of the objective
grounding of morality needed to refute nihilism. That does not mean that moral
practice and discussion are an unimportant part of our lives or that we are not
willing to live by, defend and enforce those practices. But our beliefs and
their defense cannot be grounded in more than our individual and community
determination to pursue certain goals and adhere to certain norms of conduct.
(See Krellenstein, 2006.)
(December,
2009)
8.1
We would be better off not using the word 'moral'
Given
the widespread but apparently false belief that there are true, absolute moral
values we would probably be better off eliminating from our vocabulary the
words that imply the existence of such values -- words such as 'moral', 'right'
and 'wrong'. Such 'moral abolitionism' has been suggested by others who deny
the existence of moral absolutes, including Greene (2002), Burgess (in an early
unpublished work finally published in 2007) and Garner (2007). It would likely
be better to refer to positions one favors or opposes rather than describe them
as 'right' or 'wrong'. This would not prevent us from reasoning about values
and their implications. It would also not prevent us from adopting and living
by particular values we believe are in our interest, supporting/condemning
actions vigorously or choosing to punish or fight those who violate norms we
endorse. But it would eliminate language that implies there are values or
obligations that command obedience of oneself or another because of their
objective truth. Discussing values as personal (if sometimes widely shared) and
relative would likely make 'moral' disagreements less intractable and more like
other disagreements, increasing the possibilities for compromise. Compromise
would not be required (nothing is)...but the choice would be more accurately
focused as a practical decision to compromise or not rather than a decision
that allows no compromise by definition.
Some
who believe that moral values are not absolute (e.g., Joyce, 2001) nevertheless
think we might be better retaining the fiction of moral absolutes and continue
to speak of 'right' and 'wrong'...that such talk would better reinforce the
shared values a community has, providing a net benefit. Whether this is the
case is, as Joyce and others have observed, an empirical question, but one
might hope that people could see values for what they are and learn to better
understand and reason about differences in them while still respecting their
importance. (One exception to eliminating the language of moral realism (i.e.,
that there are objective moral truths) might be for raising children, where a
simpler approach may be needed to encourage particular behaviors. Greene (2002)
observes that we might "simply allow or even encourage realist dialogue
with those who are too young to handle the meta-ethical truth [that there are
no moral absolutes]"(p. 279).)
References
Burgess,
J. (2007). Against ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(5), pp.
427-439.
Caputo,
J. (2000). The end of ethics. In LaFollette, H. (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to
ethical theory (pp. 111-128). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Garner,
R. (2007). Abolishing morality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 10(5), pp.
499-513.
Greene,
J. (2002). The terrible, horrible, no good, very bad truth about morality and
what to do about it. Doctoral dissertation, Department of Philosophy, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ.
Haidt,
J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist
approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814-834.
Harman,
G. & Thomson, J. (1996). Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing.
Joyce,
R. (2001). The myth of morality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kramer,
P. (1993). Listening to Prozac. New York: Penguin Books.
Krellenstein,
M. (1995). Unsolvable problems, visual imagery and explanatory satisfaction.
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16:235-254. Available at http://cogprints.org/1957/
Krellenstein,
M. (2006). Morality without a net: A reply to Pinker on avoiding nihilism. Available at http://www.epps.com/mk/morality-without-a-net.html
Mackie,
J. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. New York: Penguin.
McGinn,
C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind, 391, 349-366.
Miller,
A. (2003). An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge, UK: Polity
Press.
Nozick,
R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Nozick,
R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Nozick,
R. (2001). Invariances: The structure of the objective world. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Pinker,
S. (1997). How the mind works. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Pinker,
S. (2002). The blank slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York: Viking
Penguin.
Singer,
P. (1993). Practical ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein,
L. (1961). Tractatus logico-philosophicus [D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness,
Trans.]. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1921)