Structure and Dynamics in Implementation of Computations

Mallah, Dr. Jacques (2014) Structure and Dynamics in Implementation of Computations. [Conference Paper] (Unpublished)


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Without a proper restriction on mappings, virtually any system could be seen as implementing any computation. That would not allow characterization of systems in terms of implemented computations and is not compatible with a computationalist philosophy of mind. Information-based criteria for independence of substates within structured states are proposed as a solution. Objections to the use of requirements for transitions in counterfactual states are addressed, in part using the partial-brain argument as a general counterargument to neural replacement arguments.

Item Type:Conference Paper
Keywords:structure, dynamics, implementation, computation, independence, inheritance, transference, counterfactual, structured states, neural replacement, partial brain
Subjects:Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Computer Science > Dynamical Systems
Philosophy > Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy > Philosophy of Science
ID Code:9207
Deposited By: Mallah, Dr. Jacques
Deposited On:25 Feb 2014 12:52
Last Modified:10 May 2014 00:07

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References in Article

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