@misc{cogprints104, volume = {22}, number = {1}, title = {Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.}, author = {Max Velmans}, year = {1999}, pages = {172--173}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, keywords = {neural activation, phenomenal, information, semantic coding, conscious, unconscious, explicit, implicit}, url = {http://cogprints.org/104/}, abstract = {O'Brien \& Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.} }