@misc{cogprints104,
          volume = {22},
          number = {1},
           title = {Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.},
          author = {Max Velmans},
            year = {1999},
           pages = {172--173},
         journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
        keywords = {neural activation, phenomenal, information, semantic coding, conscious, unconscious, explicit, implicit},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/104/},
        abstract = {O'Brien \& Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.}
}

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