<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . "Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness."^^ . "O'Brien & Opie defend a \"vehicle\" rather than a \"process\" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is \"explicit\". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism."^^ . "1999" . . "22" . "1" . . "Behavioral and Brain Sciences"^^ . . . . . . . . "Max"^^ . "Velmans"^^ . "Max Velmans"^^ . . . . . . "Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness. (HTML)"^^ . . . "OPIE.html"^^ . . . "Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness. (Indexer Terms)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #104 \n\nNeural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "Cognitive Psychology" . . . "Neuropsychology" . .