TY  - GEN
ID  - cogprints104
UR  - http://cogprints.org/104/
A1  - Velmans, Max
Y1  - 1999///
N2  - O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
KW  - neural activation
KW  -  phenomenal
KW  -  information
KW  -  semantic coding
KW  -  conscious
KW  -  unconscious
KW  -  explicit
KW  -  implicit
TI  - Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.
SP  - 172
AV  - public
EP  - 173
ER  -

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