TY - GEN ID - cogprints104 UR - http://cogprints.org/104/ A1 - Velmans, Max Y1 - 1999/// N2 - O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism. KW - neural activation KW - phenomenal KW - information KW - semantic coding KW - conscious KW - unconscious KW - explicit KW - implicit TI - Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness. SP - 172 AV - public EP - 173 ER -