%A Max Velmans
%J Behavioral and Brain Sciences
%T Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.
%X O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
%N 1
%K neural activation, phenomenal, information, semantic coding, conscious, unconscious, explicit, implicit
%P 172-173
%V 22
%D 1999
%L cogprints104

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