creators_name: Velmans, Max
type: journalp
datestamp: 1999-07-06
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:40
metadata_visibility: show
title: Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.
ispublished: pub
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: neuro-psy
full_text_status: public
keywords: neural activation, phenomenal, information, semantic coding, conscious, unconscious, explicit, implicit
abstract: O'Brien & Opie defend a "vehicle" rather than a "process" theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is "explicit". I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
date: 1999
date_type: published
publication: Behavioral and Brain Sciences
volume: 22
number: 1
pagerange: 172-173
refereed: TRUE
citation:   Velmans, Max  (1999) Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/104/1/OPIE.html