%A Peter Carruthers
%J Theories of theories of mind
%T Autism as mindblindness: an elaboration and partial defence
%X In this chapter I defend the mind-blindness theory of autism, by showing how it can accommodate data which might otherwise appear problematic for it. Specifically, I show how it can explain the fact that autistic children rarely engage in spontaneous pretend-play, and also how it can explain the executive-function deficits which are characteristic of the syndrome. I do this by emphasising what I take to be an entailment of the mind-blindness theory, that autistic subjects have difficulties of access to their own mental states, as well as to the mental states of other people.
%K autism, mind-blindness, executive function, self-knowledge, pretend play
%P 257-276
%E Peter Carruthers
%E Peter K Smith
%D 1996
%I Cambridge University Press
%L cogprints1193

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