---
abstract: 'In this chapter I attempt to curb the pretensions of simulationism. I argue that it is, at best, an epistemological doctrine of limited scope. It may explain how we go about attributing beliefs and desires to others, and perhaps to ourselves, in some cases. But simulation cannot provide the fundamental basis of our conception of, or knowledge of, minded agency.'
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chapter: 3
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creators_name:
- family: Carruthers
given: Peter
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
date: 1996
date_type: published
datestamp: 2001-01-09
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dir: disk0/00/00/11/94
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editors_name:
- family: Carruthers
given: Peter
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- family: Smith
given: Peter K
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
eprint_status: archive
eprintid: 1194
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1194/1/Simula~1.htm
full_text_status: public
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keywords: 'Simulation, theory-theory, self-knowledge, Gordon, Goldman'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:28
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metadata_visibility: show
note: ~
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pagerange: 22-38
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publication: Theories of theories of mind
publisher: Cambridge University Press
refereed: TRUE
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rev_number: 8
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:36:54
subjects:
- dev-psy
- phil-mind
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thesistype: ~
title: 'Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory'
type: bookchapter
userid: 1231
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