---
abstract: 'This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological. '
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creators_name:
  - family: Carruthers
    given: Peter
    honourific: ''
    lineage: ''
date: 1999
date_type: published
datestamp: 2001-01-11
department: ~
dir: disk0/00/00/12/04
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editors_name:
  - family: D'Agostino
    given: Fred
    honourific: ''
    lineage: ''
eprint_status: archive
eprintid: 1204
fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1204/1/Sympathy.htm
full_text_status: public
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keywords: 'sympathy, subjectivity, animals, consciousness'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:28
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metadata_visibility: show
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number: 4
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pubdom: FALSE
publication: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
publisher: Oxford University Press
refereed: TRUE
referencetext: ~
relation_type: []
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reportno: ~
rev_number: 8
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status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:36:56
subjects:
  - phil-ethics
  - phil-mind
succeeds: ~
suggestions: ~
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thesistype: ~
title: Sympathy and subjectivity
type: journale
userid: 1231
volume: 77
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