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--- abstract: "It is widely held that the methods of AI are the appropriate methods for cognitive science. Fodor, however, has argued that AI bears the same relation to psychology as Disneyland does to physics. This claim is examined in light of the widespread but paradoxical acceptance of the Turing Test--a behavioral criterion of intelligence--among advocates of cognitivism. It is argued that, given the recalcitrance of certain deep conceptual problems in psychology, and disagreements concerning psychology's basic vocabulary, it is unlikely that AI will prove to be very psychologically enlightening until after some consensus on ontological issues in psychology is achieved. " altloc: - http://www.yorku.ca/christo/papers/ffphf.htm chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Green given: Christopher D. honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1996 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-03-04 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/13/41 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1341 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1341/1/ffphf.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'artificial intelligence, computational functionalism, Fodor, methodology, ontology, theory, Turing Test ' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:35 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: 95-106 pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence publisher: ~ refereed: TRUE referencetext: |- Dennett, D. C. (1991a). Granny's campaign for safe science. In B. Loewer & G. Rey (Eds.), Meaning in mind: Fodor and his critics (pp. 255-319). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Dennett, D. C. (1991b). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown, & company. Fodor, J. A. (1968). Psychological explanation: An introduction to the philosophy of psychology. New York: Random House. Fodor, J. A. (1981a) . The mind-body problem. Scientific American, 244, 114-123. Fodor, J. A. (1981b). Introduction: Something on the state of the art. In Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-31). Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. Fodor, J. A. (1991). Replies. In B. Loewer & G. Rey (Eds.), Meaning in mind: Fodor and his critics (pp. 255-319). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Fodor, J. A. & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71. Fodor, J. (1992, July). The big idea: Can there be a science of mind? Times Literary Supplement, pp. 5-7. Harnad, S. (1989). Minds, machines, and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1, pp.-pp. Harnad, S. (1992). The Turing Test is not a trick: Turing indistinguishability is a scientific criterion. SIGART Bulletin, 3(4), 9-10. Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial intelligence: The very idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1984). Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-424. Searle, J. (1984). Minds, brains, and science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Searle, J. (1992). The rediscovery of mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Turing, A. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 434-460. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:37:24 subjects: - cog-psy - comp-sci-art-intel - phil-sci succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: 'Fodor, functions, physics, and fantasyland: Is AI a Mickey Mouse discipline?' type: journale userid: 1236 volume: 8