"1413","The Disunity of Consciousness","It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the \"unity of consciousness\". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis. ","http://cogprints.org/1413/","O'Brien, Gerard and Opie, Jon","UNSPECIFIED","       <span class=\"person_name\">O'Brien, Gerard</span> and <span class=\"person_name\">Opie, Jon</span>     (1998)  <a href=\"http://cogprints.org/1413/\"><em>The Disunity of Consciousness.</em></a>       [Journal (Paginated)]           ","","1998"
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