<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . "A Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's “What is a Theory of Mental Representation?”"^^ . "Stich begins his paper \"What is a Theory of Mental Representation?\" (1992) by noting that while\nthere is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market\nplace, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is\nsupposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such\nreflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of\nall, according to Stich, is that most of the philosophers in this field are undertaking work that is\nquite futile:\nIt is my contention that most of the players in this very crowded field have no coherent project\nthat could possibly be pursued successfully with the methods they are using. (p.244)\nStich readily admits that this is a startling conclusion; so startling, he thinks, that some may even\ntake it as an indication that he has simply \"failed to figure out what those who are searching for\na theory of mental representation are up to\" (p.244). But it is a conclusion that he is willing to\nstand by, and he sets about it defending it in the body of his paper.\nStich, I think, is right about this—I do take his conclusion to indicate that he has failed to\nfigure out what those who are searching for a theory of mental representation are up to. And he\nhas failed to do this largely because he has failed to distinguish between the theory of mind that is\nimplicit in our folk psychology and the mental mechanism that is responsible for our capacity to\nmake folk psychological judgements. When this conflation is undone, so too is the reasoning that\ntakes Stich to his startling conclusion. This is not to say that the conclusion itself is clearly false; it\nis merely to say that Stich has failed to show that it is true.\nIn what follows I will defend this analysis of Stich's self-conscious reflections on what a\ntheory of mental representation is supposed to do. I will begin with a very brief exposition of\nStich's survey of the logical terrain in this part of the philosophical landscape and the line of\nreasoning that subsequently delivers up the aforementioned conclusion. I will then go on to\nargue that the latter line of reasoning is fundamentally misdirected because of an error in the\nformer survey."^^ . "1993" . . . "Research School of Social Sciences"^^ . . . "Prospects for Intentionality Working Papers in Philosophy"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "I"^^ . "Ravenscroft"^^ . "I Ravenscroft"^^ . . "K"^^ . "Neander"^^ . "K Neander"^^ . . "Gerard"^^ . "O’Brien"^^ . "Gerard O’Brien"^^ . . . . . . "A Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's “What is a Theory of Mental Representation?” (PDF)"^^ . . . . . . . . . "A_Conflation_of_Folk_Psychologies.pdf"^^ . . . "A Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's “What is a Theory of Mental Representation?” (Indexer Terms)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #1450 \n\nA Conflation of Folk Psychologies: A Commentary on Stich's “What is a Theory of Mental Representation?”\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "Philosophy of Mind" . .