%A Gerard O'Brien
%A Jon Opie
%J Behavioral and Brain Sciences
%T Putting Content into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness
%X The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies
consciousness with the brain?s explicit representation of information in the form of stable
patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and
empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on
vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter
front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific
attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by
considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the
active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong.
%K connectionism, phenomenal experience, classicism, vehicle theory of consciousness, process theory of consciousness, philosophy of mind, dissociation, mental representation
%P 175-196
%V 22
%D 1999
%I Cambridge University Press
%L cogprints1466

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