<ctx:context-object xsi:schemaLocation="info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx http://www.openurl.info/registry/docs/info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx" timestamp="2011-03-11T08:54:40Z" xmlns:ctx="info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:ctx" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XML"><ctx:referent><ctx:identifier>info:oai:cogprints.org:1578</ctx:identifier><ctx:metadata-by-val><ctx:format>info:ofi/fmt:xml:xsd:oai_dc</ctx:format><ctx:metadata><oai_dc:dc xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
        <dc:title>Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem</dc:title>
        <dc:creator>Harnad, Stevan</dc:creator>
        <dc:subject>Cognitive Psychology</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Artificial Intelligence</dc:subject>
        <dc:subject>Philosophy of Mind</dc:subject>
        <dc:description>Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the
other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a
mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use
some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such
that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what
is "everything" a body with a mind can do? Turing's original "pen-pal" version (the
TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless
symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT)
calls for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it
suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out
the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a
body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance
requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the
unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential
for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body. 
</dc:description>
        <dc:date>1991</dc:date>
        <dc:type>Journal (Paginated)</dc:type>
        <dc:type>PeerReviewed</dc:type>
        <dc:format>text/html</dc:format>
        <dc:identifier>http://cogprints.org/1578/1/harnad91.otherminds.html</dc:identifier>
        <dc:identifier>  Harnad, Stevan  (1991) Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem.  [Journal (Paginated)]     </dc:identifier>
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