---
abstract: |-
To summarize, if we speak only about the information available in an object or
a data structure -- and forget for now that we have mental lives at all,
concerning ourselves only with our performance capacities -- it seems clear
that array representations are merely another form of symbolic information.
Are they likely to be the only form of internal representation, or the main one,
that explains our visual and spatial capacities? I think not; I think tasks like
Shepard & Cooper's (1982) ``mental rotation'' may be better accounted for by
internal representations that do not turn transducer projections into numbers
at all, but preserve them in analog form, one that is physically invertible by an
analog transformation that is one-to-one with the transducer projection (to
some subsensory and subcognitive level of neural granularity). In other words,
I agree with Glasgow that it is a matter of preserving information in the internal
representation, but I am not persuaded that arrays are the form the preserved
information takes (see Camberlain & Barlow 1982; Jeannerod 1994).
altloc: []
chapter: ~
commentary: ~
commref: 'J.I. Glasgow: "The Imagery Debate Revisited."'
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creators_id: []
creators_name:
- family: Harnad
given: Stevan
honourific: ''
lineage: ''
date: 1993
date_type: published
datestamp: 2001-06-18
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dir: disk0/00/00/15/90
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eprintid: 1590
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full_text_status: public
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keywords: 'arrays, mental images, symbols'
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:41
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longitude: ~
metadata_visibility: show
note: ~
number: 4
pagerange: 309-333
pubdom: FALSE
publication: Computational Intelligence
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refereed: TRUE
referencetext: |-2
CHAMBERLAIN, S.C. & BARLOW, R.B. 1982. Retinotopic organization of lateral eye input to Limulus brain. Journal of
Neurophysiology, 48: 505-520.
HARNAD, S. 1982. Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory, 5: 29 - 47.
HARNAD, S. 1987. The induction and representation of categories. In: Harnad, S. (ed.) Categorical Perception: The
Groundwork of Cognition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
HARNAD, S. 1990a. The symbol grounding problem. Physica D, 42: 335-346.
HARNAD, S. 1990b. Against computational hermeneutics, Invited commentary on Eric Dietrich's computationalism. Social
Epistemology, 4: 167-172.
HARNAD, S. 1990c. Lost in the hermeneutic hall of mirrors, Invited commentary on Michael Dyer's ``Minds, machines, Searle
and Harnad''. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2: 321 - 327.
HARNAD, S. 1991. Other bodies, Other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Minds and Machines, 1:
43-54.
HARNAD, S. 1992. Connecting Object to Symbol in Modeling Cognition. In: A. Clarke and R. Lutz (Eds) Connectionism in
Context Springer Verlag.
JEANNEROD, M. 1994. The representing brain: neural correlates of motor intention and imagery. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 17(2) in press.
SEARLE, J. R. 1980. Minds, brains and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417-457.
SHEPARD, R. N. and L. A. COOPER. 1982. Mental images and their transformations. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
relation_type: []
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reportno: ~
rev_number: 8
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source: ~
status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:38:52
subjects:
- percep-cog-psy
succeeds: ~
suggestions: ~
sword_depositor: ~
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thesistype: ~
title: Exorcizing the Ghost of Mental Imagery
type: journalp
userid: 63
volume: 9