2001-06-19Z2011-03-11T08:54:41Zhttp://cogprints.org/id/eprint/1593This item is in the repository with the URL: http://cogprints.org/id/eprint/15932001-06-19ZGrounding symbols in sensorimotor categories with neural networksIt is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of
computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just
computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol
system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a
remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too:
Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by external interpreters as meaning something. However,
unlike symbols in symbol systems, thoughts mean what they mean autonomously: Their meaning does
not consist of or depend on anyone making or being able to make any external interpretations of them
at all. When I think "the cat is on the mat," the meaning of that thought is autonomous; it does not
depend on YOUR being able to interpret it as meaning that (even though you could interpret it that
way, and you would be right).Stevan Harnad