@misc{cogprints1593,
           title = {Grounding symbols in sensorimotor categories with neural networks},
          author = {Stevan Harnad},
            year = {1995},
        keywords = {cognition, computation, symbol grounding, neural networks },
             url = {http://cogprints.org/1593/},
        abstract = {It is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of
computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just
computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol
system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a
remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too:
Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by external interpreters as meaning something. However,
unlike symbols in symbol systems, thoughts mean what they mean autonomously: Their meaning does
not consist of or depend on anyone making or being able to make any external interpretations of them
at all. When I think "the cat is on the mat," the meaning of that thought is autonomous; it does not
depend on YOUR being able to interpret it as meaning that (even though you could interpret it that
way, and you would be right).}
}

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