Grounding symbols in sensorimotor categories with neural networksStevanHarnadauthorIt is unlikely that the systematic, compositional properties of formal symbol systems -- i.e., of
computation -- play no role at all in cognition. However, it is equally unlikely that cognition is just
computation, because of the symbol grounding problem (Harnad 1990): The symbols in a symbol
system are systematically interpretable, by external interpreters, as meaning something, and that is a
remarkable and powerful property of symbol systems. Cognition (i.e., thinking), has this property too:
Our thoughts are systematically interpretable by external interpreters as meaning something. However,
unlike symbols in symbol systems, thoughts mean what they mean autonomously: Their meaning does
not consist of or depend on anyone making or being able to make any external interpretations of them
at all. When I think "the cat is on the mat," the meaning of that thought is autonomous; it does not
depend on YOUR being able to interpret it as meaning that (even though you could interpret it that
way, and you would be right).Artificial IntelligenceDynamical SystemsNeural NetsPerceptual Cognitive Psychology1995Conference Paper