creators_name: Harnad, Stevan
type: journalp
datestamp: 2001-06-19
lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:42
metadata_visibility: show
title: Correlation vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard
ispublished: pub
subjects: cog-psy
subjects: phil-mind
full_text_status: public
keywords: mind/body problem, feeling, functionalism, qualia, computationalism, consciousness, other-minds problem, causality, dualism, epiphenomenalism 
abstract: The Mind/Body Problem (M/BP) is about causation not correlation. And its solution (if there is one) will require a
mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just
supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job
perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality
is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and that's the hard part. 
date: 2000
date_type: published
publication: Journal of Consciousness Studies
volume: 7
number: 4
publisher: Imprint Academic
pagerange: 54-61
refereed: TRUE
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citation:   Harnad, Stevan  (2000) Correlation vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind/Body Problem Is Hard.  [Journal (Paginated)]     
document_url: http://cogprints.org/1617/1/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html