<mods:mods version="3.3" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-3.xsd" xmlns:mods="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><mods:titleInfo><mods:title>There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem</mods:title></mods:titleInfo><mods:name type="personal"><mods:namePart type="given">Stevan</mods:namePart><mods:namePart type="family">Harnad</mods:namePart><mods:role><mods:roleTerm type="text">author</mods:roleTerm></mods:role></mods:name><mods:abstract>In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body
problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of
"intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is
indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless.
For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect
but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to
re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual
categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic. 
</mods:abstract><mods:classification authority="lcc">Cognitive Psychology</mods:classification><mods:classification authority="lcc">Philosophy of Mind</mods:classification><mods:originInfo><mods:dateIssued encoding="iso8061">1992</mods:dateIssued></mods:originInfo><mods:genre>Conference Paper</mods:genre></mods:mods>