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%A Stevan Harnad
%T There Is Only One Mind/Body Problem
%X In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body
problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of
"intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is
indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless.
For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect
but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to
re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual
categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic.
%D 1992
%K mind/body problem, qualia, intentionality, Turing test, Total Turing Test
%L cogprints1625