This site has been permanently archived. This is a static copy provided by the University of Southampton.
--- abstract: |- In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, �representation-level� rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain�s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new focus � one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the mind. Indeed, if Horgan and Tienson�s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance theory of mental content. altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: O'Brien given: Gerard honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 1998 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-07-10 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/16/75 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1675 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png;/1675/3/Connectionism_Analogicity_and_Mental_Content.pdf full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: pub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: 'phenomenal consciousness, connectionism, mental representation, vehicle theory of consciousness, process theory of consciousness, philosophy of mind' lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:44 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: 111-131 pubdom: FALSE publication: Acta Analytica publisher: Roll Verlag refereed: TRUE referencetext: | Blachowicz, J. (1997): �Analog representation beyond mental imagery�, Journal of Philosophy 94: 55-84. Churchland, P.M. (1988): Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Churchland, P.S. and Sejnowski, T (1992): The Computational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cummins, R. (1989): Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cummins, R. (1996): Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cummins, R. and Schwarz, G. (1991): �Connectionism, computation, and cognition�, in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, T.Horgan and J.Tienson, eds. Kluwer. Dietrich, E. (1989): �Semantics and the computational paradigm in cognitive psychology�, Synthese 79: 119- 41. Edelman, S. (forthcoming): �Representation is the representation of similarities�, forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. Files, C. (1996): �Goodman�s rejection of resemblance� British Journal of Aesthetics 36: 398-412. Fodor, J. (1975): The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, J. (1992): �The big idea: Can there be a science of the mind?�, Times Literary Supplement July 3: 5-7. Gardenfors, P. (1996): �Mental representation, conceptual spaces and metaphors�, Synthese 106: 21-47. Gilman, D. (1994): �Pictures in cognition�, Erkenntnis 41: 87-102 Goodman, N. (1969): Languages of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hodges, A. (1983): Alan Turing: The Enigma of Intelligence. London: Unwin. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (1996): Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lewis, D. (1971) �Analog and digital�, Nous 5: 321-27. McClelland, J. and Rumelhart, D., eds. (1986): Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition Vol. 2: Psychological and Biological Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Palmer, S. (1978): �Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation� in Cognition and Categorization, E.Rosch and B.Lloyd, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rumelhart, D. and McClelland, J. eds. (1986): Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition Vol 1: Foundations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sejnowski, T. (1986): �Open questions about computation in cerebral cortex� in McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986, 372-89. Sejnowski, T. and Rosenberg, C. (1987): �Parallel networks that learn to pronounce English text�, Complex Systems 1: 145-68. Shepard, R. and Chipman, S. (1970): �Second-order isomorphism of internal representations: Shapes of states�, Cognitive Psychology 1: 1-17. Shepard, R. and Metzler, J. (1971): �Mental rotation of three-dimensional objects�, Science 171: 701-703 Smolensky, P. (1988): On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11: 1-23. Swoyer, C. (1991): Structural representation and surrogative reasoning�, Synthese 87: 449-508. Trenholme, R. (1994): �Analog simulation�, Philosophy of Science, 61: 115-31. Van Gelder, T. (1995): �What might cognition be, if not computation?�, Journal of Philosophy 91: 345-381. Von Eckardt, B. (1993): What is Cognitive Science? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 12 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:39:36 subjects: - cog-psy - comp-neuro-sci - phil-mind succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: 'Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content' type: journalp userid: 333 volume: 22