@misc{cogprints170,
          editor = {R. and Maes Brooks},
           title = {Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization},
          author = {M. Oliphant},
       publisher = {MIT Press},
            year = {1998},
           pages = {349--352},
        keywords = {prisoner's dilemma, evolution of altruism, genetic algorithm, spatial organization, game theory},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/170/},
        abstract = {Most work on evolving cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma treats the non-iterated game as an undesirable simple case that should be risen above. It has been taken as a given that populations evolving to play the non-iterated game will always converge on defection. This paper questions this assumption, and demonstrates that organizing a population spatially dramatically changes the nature of the game and allows cooperation to emerge.}
}

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