creators_name: Oliphant, M. editors_name: Brooks, R. and Maes type: confpaper datestamp: 1998-06-15 lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:53:42 metadata_visibility: show title: Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization ispublished: pub subjects: bio-ani-behav subjects: bio-ani-cog subjects: bio-etho subjects: bio-evo subjects: bio-pop subjects: bio-socio subjects: soc-psy full_text_status: public keywords: prisoner's dilemma, evolution of altruism, genetic algorithm, spatial organization, game theory abstract: Most work on evolving cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma treats the non-iterated game as an undesirable simple case that should be risen above. It has been taken as a given that populations evolving to play the non-iterated game will always converge on defection. This paper questions this assumption, and demonstrates that organizing a population spatially dramatically changes the nature of the game and allows cooperation to emerge. date: 1998 date_type: published publisher: MIT Press pagerange: 349-352 refereed: FALSE citation: Oliphant, M. (1998) Evolving cooperation in the non-iterated prisoner's dilemma: The importance of spatial organization. [Conference Paper] document_url: http://cogprints.org/170/2/pd.ps