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--- abstract: 'This article presents the view that the �problem of consciousness� � per definition � can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of contrastive analysis, widely used in cognitive neuroscience. However, this criticism does not lead to the conclusion that scientific methods are inadequate as such, only that they always work on a pre-established background of theory, of which one must be explicit.' altloc: [] chapter: ~ commentary: ~ commref: ~ confdates: ~ conference: ~ confloc: ~ contact_email: ~ creators_id: [] creators_name: - family: Overgaard given: Morten honourific: '' lineage: '' date: 2000 date_type: published datestamp: 2001-12-14 department: ~ dir: disk0/00/00/19/82 edit_lock_since: ~ edit_lock_until: ~ edit_lock_user: ~ editors_id: [] editors_name: [] eprint_status: archive eprintid: 1982 fileinfo: /style/images/fileicons/text_html.png;/1982/1/Problems_in_the_functional_investigations_of_consciousness.htm full_text_status: public importid: ~ institution: ~ isbn: ~ ispublished: unpub issn: ~ item_issues_comment: [] item_issues_count: 0 item_issues_description: [] item_issues_id: [] item_issues_reported_by: [] item_issues_resolved_by: [] item_issues_status: [] item_issues_timestamp: [] item_issues_type: [] keywords: Consciousness; science; functionalism; contrastive analysis; scientific explanation; philosophical explanation; methodology lastmod: 2011-03-11 08:54:51 latitude: ~ longitude: ~ metadata_visibility: show note: ~ number: ~ pagerange: ~ pubdom: FALSE publication: ~ publisher: ~ refereed: FALSE referencetext: | Baars, B. 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(1995): What would count as explaining consciousness?, in T. Metzinger (ed.): Conscious Experience, Sch�ningh Varela, F.J. (1996): Neurophenomenology, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 4, 330-349 Velmans, M. (1991): Is human information processing conscious?, Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 14, 651-726 Wilkes, K. (1984): Is consciousness important? British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 35, 223-243 relation_type: [] relation_uri: [] reportno: ~ rev_number: 8 series: ~ source: ~ status_changed: 2007-09-12 16:42:13 subjects: - cog-psy - phil-mind - phil-sci succeeds: ~ suggestions: ~ sword_depositor: ~ sword_slug: ~ thesistype: ~ title: Problems in the "functional" investigations of consciousness type: other userid: 2497 volume: ~