@misc{cogprints2235,
          editor = {Denis Walsh},
           title = {Consciousness: explaining the phenomena.},
          author = {Peter Carruthers},
       publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
            year = {2002},
           pages = {61--85},
         journal = {Naturalism, Evolution and Mind.},
        keywords = {phenomenal consciousness
higher-order experience
consciousness
higher-order thought},
             url = {http://cogprints.org/2235/},
        abstract = {Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an 'explanatory gap' between physical and/or intentional states and processes, on the one hand, and phenomenal consciousness, on the other. I reply that, since we have purely recognitional concepts of experience, there is indeed a sort of gap at the level of concepts; but this need not mean that the properties picked out by those concepts are inexplicable. I show how dispositionalist higher-order thought (HOT) theory can reductively explain the subjective feel of experience by deploying a form of 'consumer semantics'. First-order perceptual contents become transformed, acquiring a dimension of subjectivity, by virtue to their availability to a mind-reading (HOT generating) consumer system.}
}

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